Appeal No.	 EAT/928/99

EMPLOYMENT APPEAL TRIBUNAL
58 VICTORIA EMBANKMENT, LONDON EC4Y 0DS

	At the Tribunal
	On 27 July 1999

Before
THE HONOURABLE MR JUSTICE MORISON (P)
(AS IN CHAMBERS)

MESSRS SPROULLS	APPELLANTS

MR V M BRUCE	RESPONDENT

Transcript of Proceedings

JUDGMENT

INTERLOCUTORY HEARING

Revised

	APPEARANCES

For the Appellants	MR D BROWN
(of Counsel)
Instructed By:
Mr D Sproull
Messrs Sproulls
Solicitors
Market Place
Camelford
Cornwall PL32 9PD	
For the Respondent	NO APPEARANCE OR
REPRESENTATION
BY OR ON BEHALF OF
THE RESPONDENT	

MR JUSTICE MORISON (PRESIDENT):	This is an appeal against the grant of an adjournment by an Employment Tribunal.  The litigation between the parties is extensive in a limited sense.

1	The Respondent to this appeal, Mr Bruce, applied for a position with Sproulls, the Solicitors.  He was not successful in his application and accordingly, as he is a disabled person, he served a questionnaire and brought proceedings in an Employment Tribunal alleging that he had been unlawfully discriminated against on the grounds of his disability.

2	As a result of the case being transferred from the area in which Sproulls operates, namely in Cornwall to Leeds, not surprisingly the Respondents to his application, Sproulls, took the view that it would be sensible to offer Mr Bruce some money without an admission of liability.  That was done.  They had some contact (and it is not clear what) with other Solicitors in the area and, as a result of that activity, Mr Bruce brought a further complaint alleging that he had been victimised by Messrs Sproulls.

3	In due course (and it is unnecessary to recite the history of those proceedings) that application was withdrawn by Mr Bruce, whereupon Messrs Sproulls exercised their right to apply to have their costs thrown away by this exercise, paid for by Mr Bruce.

4	The hearing which is fixed for 23 August is a hearing of Sproulls’ application for costs against Mr Bruce.  Mr Bruce is in a wheelchair and it is clear that he requires, when he is travelling some distance, to have the services of a professional carer with him.  He provided to the Employment Tribunal material which indicated that his carer had let him down and would not be available for 23 August.  The date was chosen to suit the convenience of Mr Bruce and the fact that he was applying on 16 August for an adjournment was a matter of some concern to Messrs Sproulls who, no doubt, had made arrangements to attend the hearing on 23 August.

5	The application for an adjournment was granted by the Employment Tribunal Chairman.  Although Messrs Sproulls were aware of the application for an adjournment, it looks as though the decision to grant the adjournment was made before Messrs Sproulls had had a proper opportunity to make their own representations about the matter.  It is their belief that alternative care arrangements could adequately have been made by Mr Bruce which would have avoided the necessity for an adjournment.

6	The agency, through whom he obtains his carer, have very recently provided written confirmation that there was an emergency which necessitated the application for an adjournment, and they pointed out in this document the fact that Mr Bruce needs to meet a carer who will be accompanying him for a period of two days to discuss his requirements, and that the carer is now, due to unforeseen circumstances, no longer available.

7	Mr Brown, on behalf of Messrs Sproulls, argues that there was a breach of natural justice by the Tribunal not allowing a response to the application for an adjournment.  It is their belief, as I understand it on behalf of his clients, that Mr Bruce is abusing the process of the Tribunal by making applications in the first place and then frequently asking for an adjournment.

8	This is an interlocutory discretionary matter for the Employment Tribunal and we are obviously slow to intervene unless there has been some identifiable error of law.  Faced with the circumstances with which this Tribunal was faced, it was not surprising that the application for an adjournment was granted, although it might have been better had the Tribunal given a little more time to Messrs Sproulls to respond to the application to see if they had anything useful they could say.

9	It seems to us that the exercise of the Tribunal’s discretion is not one with which we can interfere and, therefore, the appeal must be dismissed.

10	We should add that although it is a principle of our law that people should be entitled to their day in court, there is a limit on that right.  It seems to us that there may come a time when, if Mr Bruce is not available, the Tribunal will have to determine the case in his absence.

11	Whilst it is a matter entirely for the Employment Tribunal, they may take the view that if a further date is fixed with the co-operation of Mr Bruce, he should be told that the case will take place on that day, whether or not he is able to attend.  That will do justice to both parties in the case but, as I say, that matter is for the Employment Tribunal to decide for themselves.

12	Accordingly the appeal is dismissed.