Appeal No.	 EAT/862/99

EMPLOYMENT APPEAL TRIBUNAL
58 VICTORIA EMBANKMENT, LONDON EC4Y 0DS

	At the Tribunal
	On 18 November 1999

Before
HIS HONOUR JUDGE WILKIE QC
MR L D COWAN
MRS M T PROSSER

MISS S HOLLAND	APPELLANT

RICHMOND HOUSE GROUP PLC	RESPONDENTS

Transcript of Proceedings

JUDGMENT

PRELIMINARY HEARING

Revised

	APPEARANCES

For the Appellant	Mr R S Symonds
(Free Representation Unit)	

JUDGE WILKIE:
1	This is an Appeal by Miss Stacy Holland against the decision of the Employment Tribunal sitting at Bedford on the 6 April and 2 June of this year, which resulted in a decision dated 15 June of this year in which they dismissed her claims for sex discrimination, dismissal by reason of pregnancy and declared that the reason for her dismissal was redundancy.  

2	Miss Holland had the advantage at the Tribunal of being represented by Mr Symonds from the Free Representation Unit, who has also represented her today. It is clear from the decision of the Tribunal that they derived great assistance from his manful efforts on her behalf, and from the clarity of his argument.  We echo that from our experience of his advocacy today.  

3	In essence he focuses on the reasoning of the Tribunal at paragraph 6 of the decision.  It is right to say, however, that that paragraph commences by referring to its previous findings of fact.   These are set out at length and chronologically in paragraph 4, its sub paragraphs.  

4	The Tribunal in paragraph 6 referred to Mr Symonds’ skeleton argument which we are told included reference to the decision of this Tribunal in the case of O’Neill v Governors of St Thomas More RCVA Upper School [1997] ICR 33.  It reminded itself that it was not dealing with an unfair dismissal but with a case of discrimination.  It reminded itself of the need to be wary of the fact that there may be a requirement to draw an inference rather than find overt evidence of discrimination.  

5	In paragraph 6, having come to findings of fact in paragraph 4, to which it was plainly entitled to come on the evidence, the Tribunal set out, step by step, its reasoning.  In so doing it acknowledged, as was the fact, that it found, that the Appellant’s absence, by reason of a pregnancy occasioned illness, highlighted the redundancy situation in the sense that it became clearer to the Respondents that the available work could satisfactorily be done by two rather than three employees.  

6	In paragraph 4.12, the Tribunal found as a fact that, arising from recognition of that redundancy situation, a decision was made by the Respondent to reduce the head count by reason of its concern at loss of income and the fact that budgeted figures would not be achievable because of a loss of certain clients.  

7	The Tribunal then goes on to pose for itself on two separate occasions in paragraph 6, whether the Applicant’s pregnancy was an effective cause of her selection for redundancy and concludes that it was not.  She was, it concluded, selected because of her work performance.  There was ample evidence in the course of the findings of fact, set out in paragraph 4, for that conclusion to be one that was open to the Tribunal, on the evidence before it.  

8	In our judgment, this decision of the Tribunal is an exemplary one, setting out the proper steps that it has to take and then taking those steps.  It plainly recognises the role that pregnancy had in the lead up to the situation which ultimately led to the Applicant’s dismissal. In our judgment it has correctly identified the limits of that role, and has concluded, as it was entitled to, both as a matter of law and as a matter of fact, that her pregnancy was not an effective cause of her selection, and therefore her dismissal.  

9	Mr Symonds in his argument has said that Mr Beazley, in deciding to dismiss a person arising out of the redundancy situation, must have had in mind that she was pregnant, and therefore the Tribunal has erred in failing to winkle out that particular fault of reasoning.  In our judgment the Tribunal in paragraph 4.12 has made a finding of fact that the reason and the only reason, for reducing the head count was the financial situation which was manifest at the time.  

10	In paragraph 4.15 it has made findings of fact which make it clear that at that point, of the decision to make someone redundant, Mr Beazley had no view as to who was to be the person to be made redundant.  In 4.15 it sets out its findings on the processes by which the person to be made redundant was identified ultimately as this Applicant.  

11	Therefore despite best efforts Mr Symonds, he has not persuaded us that there is any reasonably arguable point, either of law or perversity, which would entitle this appeal to go forward to a full hearing, and therefore we dismiss this appeal at this preliminary stage.