Appeal Nos.	 EAT/642, 643, 644, 645, 646
 & 649/99

EMPLOYMENT APPEAL TRIBUNAL
58 VICTORIA EMBANKMENT, LONDON EC4Y 0DS

	At the Tribunal
	On 5 October 1999

Before
THE HONOURABLE MR JUSTICE HOLLAND
LORD GLADWIN OF CLEE CBE JP
MISS S M WILSON

J BARNES & C THOMAS t/a BARNES THOMAS & CO	APPELLANTS

EAT/642/99 – (1) MISS M E LEAVESLEY (2) TAYLORS SOLICITORS	RESPONDENTS
EAT/643/99 – (1) MRS J CHAMBERS (2) TAYLORS SOLICITORS	RESPONDENTS
EAT/644/99 – (1) MRS J PATTERSON (2) TAYLORS SOLICITORS	RESPONDENTS
EAT/645/99 – (1) MR C SIMMERSON (2) TAYLORS SOLICITORS	RESPONDENTS
EAT/646/99 – (1) MISS W STRAW (2) TAYLORS SOLICITORS	RESPONDENTS
EAT/649/99 – (1) MRS J WATTS (2) TAYLORS SOLICITORS	RESPONDENTS

Transcript of Proceedings

JUDGMENT

PRELIMINARY HEARING – EX PARTE

Revised

	APPEARANCES

For the Appellants	MR M E COLES
(of Counsel)
Instructed by:
Mr John P Barnes
161 Dobbin Hill
Ecclesall
Sheffield
S11 7JF	

	MR JUSTICE HOLLAND:		This matter is listed before us by way of preliminary hearing. Our task is to decide whether there is an apparent point of law raised by this appeal, such as would merit a further inter partes hearing. We say straight away that we are satisfied that there is such a point. It will, however, be helpful to say a little bit more about the case for the benefit of the tribunal that hears the matter inter partes. The facts are in short compass:

1.	The appellants were the two and sole partners in a solicitors firm. The first respondents were their employees. As found by the Employment Tribunal on 10th June 1998, there was an intervention by the Law Society conducted pursuant to the statutory powers provided in s.35 of the Solicitors Act 1974.  Turning then to paragraph 6 of the reasons:

“On 11 June 1998 another firm of solicitors was appointed to effect the intervention on behalf of the Law Society. They sent representatives to both the Chapeltown and Woodseats offices. The representatives made it clear to the staff at both offices that their presence was no longer required and informed them that they would not be paid if they remained. However the staff, including the applicant, were also told that they could remain and assist on an unpaid basis if they so wished.”

2.	The remaining facts are short; as found by the tribunal they amount to the following. The firm appears to have been in abeyance to 23rd June 1998. As at that date its practice  was transferred to a further firm of solicitors, Messrs Taylors “on a going concern basis the assets including the goodwill, the work in progress and the fixtures and fittings but excluding staff salaries, redundancy payments or other payments to an employee who is made redundant from the service of the vendors.”

3.	The tribunal made awards under various heads to the applicants. Those heads were, respectively, payment of arrears of salary to 11th June, payment in lieu of notice covering the period 11th June to 23rd June and redundancy payments.

4.	In presenting the matter to us this morning, Mr Coles realistically concedes that there is no possible appeal with respect to the pay to 11th June. Furthermore, on his case, namely that there was no dismissal as at 11th June, there would appear logically to be no argument about the monies for the period 11th June to 23rd June. His essential point relates to the finding by the tribunal that there was a dismissal for redundancy as at 11th June 1998.

5.	He submits that there are inadequate findings to support that conclusion. He submits further that that conclusion is essentially a matter of mixed law and fact and that the findings made by the tribunal are insufficient to allow that finding to be made in favour of the employees.

6.	With some reluctance, we agree that that there is a paucity of findings of fact so that it is arguable that there is insufficient to justify the finding of dismissal for redundancy and hence insufficient to justify an award of redundancy payments.

7.	Mr Coles makes the point that an intervention by the Law Society is a matter that has a range of significance. He makes the further point that those who were charged on 11th June with the task of furthering that intervention were arguably not agents for his clients so as to be able to intimate dismissal. Thus it is, he submits, that the findings are inadequate and, as will be apparent, we regard that point as arguable.

8.	The matter must therefore go forward. We would invite Mr Coles to consider the position of the second respondents, that is the firm Messrs Taylors. It has been pointed out to him that the Notice of Appeal is not very explicit when dealing with the prospects of the appeal against them. Further, it is indeed arguable that this appeal might well be conducted by agreement without their presence at all. Certain it is that some anxious consideration might be given to this aspect of the matter, if only to avoid the resultant costs likely to arise from their separate presence at this appeal hearing, that is separate from the first respondents.

9.	The case to be listed as Category C and for half a day. The Chairman’s Notes of Evidence relating to the finding that there was dismissal by reason of intervention are to be supplied. We grant leave for the Notice of Appeal to be amended within 14 days of today’s date. Skeleton arguments to be lodged with this Appeal Tribunal not less than 14 days before the date fixed for the full inter partes hearing.