Appeal No.	 EAT/537/99  

EMPLOYMENT APPEAL TRIBUNAL
58 VICTORIA EMBANKMENT, LONDON EC4Y 0DS

	At the Tribunal
	On 14 July 1999

Before
HIS HONOUR JUDGE D M LEVY QC
MR R N STRAKER
MR N D WILLIS

MRS N D PATEL	APPELLANT

1)	UNISON

2)	MS V EASTON

3)	MR S MOHAMMED	RESPONDENTS

Transcript of Proceedings

JUDGMENT

PRELIMINARY HEARING EX-PARTE

Revised

	APPEARANCES

For the Appellant	IN PERSON

And

MR G MORTON
Appearing under
EMPLOYMENT LAW
APPEAL ADVICE
SCHEME  
(ELAAS)	

JUDGE LEVY:	The Appellant, Mrs Patel, made a complaint against three Respondents – UNISON, Vicky Easton and Shaheer Mohammed – arising out of her employment as Administrative Assistant with the Leicester City branch of UNISON.  Her complaint was heard by an Employment Tribunal siting at Leicester on 9, 10, 11 and 12 November 1998 and 29 January 1999.  The decision of the Tribunal was sent to the parties on 26 February 1999.  The unanimous decision of the Tribunal was that the Applicant was not discriminated against by reason of her race by the Respondent.

1	At the outset of this judgment we feel obliged to make two comments on the presentation of the Extended Reasons.  They do not state after the heading who represented either the Applicant or the Respondents at the Tribunal.  It is always helpful to this Tribunal if appearances are shown on the opening pages of the decision.  Secondly, as Mr Morton helpfully here for the Appellant on the ELAAS scheme, has pointed out to us, there are two paragraphs numbered 14, one on page 7 of the decision (page 10 of our bundle) and the other on page 9 of the decision (page 12 of our bundle).  Such duplication can sometimes lead to complications, although it does not in this case.

2	By a Notice of Appeal dated 6 April 1999, the Appellant raises complaints which give rise to this hearing today.  The first of the complaints was that the Tribunal failed to consider the conduct against her “fulfilled most of the heads of UNISON’s checklist for Stewards defining race discrimination/victimisation in their decision”.  Secondly there is an allegation that the Tribunal’s decision was perverse, and details are given.  Paragraph 3 alleges lies and fabrications by the Respondents and one of their witnesses and paragraph 4 reads:

“In refusing to allow some of my complaints to proceed on the basis I was time-barred the Tribunal failed to take account of the fact that I did not have the benefit of advice until after the 3 month deadline had expired.”

The Appellant attached a copy of the letter she received from her union dated 29 May 1998, confirming she would be eligible to receive advice.  The Tribunal refused to extend time to consider incidents arising earlier than 3 months before the Appellant lodged her IT1.  The fifth paragraph reserved rights to amend her Notice of Appeal, which she has not relied on here.  In any event, it might be too late to bring a further ground in when an appeal is actually heard, because it would be out of time for giving a Notice of Appeal.  

3	Apart from the time-bar point, the main points on which the Appellant appeals are against findings of fact, or failure to find facts, by the Tribunal.  We have all read, and read carefully, the extended reasons of the Tribunal.  In paragraph 1, the background is set out; in paragraph 2, the law is set out; and in paragraph 3 there is an extremely clear statement of the approach which the Tribunal has to take in a case such as this, as they direct themselves.  The succeeding paragraphs set out with great care, the complaints which the Appellant has raised and the Tribunal’s findings.  

4	We are satisfied that the Tribunal was entitled to make the decision and findings that it did on the evidence which they heard.  There is, therefore, nothing in our judgment in the first four points made in the Notice of Appeal, on which the Appellant addresses herself.  As to the fifth point, Mr Morton who is here, and we welcome him as part of the ELAAS scheme, has submitted that there has been a failure properly to consider the Appellant’s case on the just and equitable grounds.  He has referred us to a decision of this Court in Aniagwu v London Borough of Hackney & Owens (1999) IRLR 303.  He has drawn our attention to paragraph 12 of the extended reasons which deal with events which occurred on 7 August 1997 and the sentences in the final paragraph of the extended reason which read as follows:

“We have considered whether or not, despite that fact, it is just and equitable to consider the applicant’s complaints.  We have concluded that, bearing in mind that at all times the applicant was well aware of the appropriate time limits and was being advised as to her position that it would not be appropriate to allow any such complaint to proceed out of time.”

5	The documents which were produced to us do to an extent suggest that some advice was given to the Applicant well after August 1997, but we consider that the Tribunal which was so careful in its decision was properly able to make the finding that the Appellant was being advised as to her position at an earlier stage.  Thus the decision not to consider incidents prior to 3 months before the IT1 was submitted was one the Employment Tribunal was entitled to make.

6	We have carefully considered Mr Morton’s submissions but we do not think that there is an arguable point to go forward based on this ground.  Accordingly, we will dismiss this appeal at this stage.