Appeal No.	 EAT/213/99

EMPLOYMENT APPEAL TRIBUNAL
58 VICTORIA EMBANKMENT, LONDON EC4Y 0DS

	At the Tribunal
	On 12 July 1999

Before
THE HONOURABLE MR JUSTICE MORISON (PRESIDENT)
MR E HAMMOND OBE
MR J A SCOULLER

MISS E MEREDITH	APPELLANT

(1) MR B FLEMING  (2) BRENDAN FLEMING LTD (A Firm)	RESPONDENTS

Transcript of Proceedings

JUDGMENT

PRELIMINARY HEARING – EX PARTE

Revised

	APPEARANCES

For the Appellant	NO APPEARANCE BY OR ON BEHALF OF THE APPELLANT	

	MR JUSTICE MORISON (PRESIDENT):	This is a preliminary hearing. It has been called on. The appellant is not here. We are content, therefore, to deal with the case on the basis of the outline of the appeal, which was treated as her Notice of Appeal, which was sent to the EAT dated 23rd December 1998.

	The appeal relates to a decision of an Employment Tribunal which rejected her complaint of sex discrimination. She had alleged that she had been sexually harassed by the principal of a firm of solicitors by whom she was employed.

	The purpose of this hearing is to determine whether there is an arguable point of law raised in the appeal. If there is, it must go for a full hearing, if not, it must be dismissed at this stage.

1.	The essence of the tribunal’s decision was that the allegations made by Miss Meredith, the appellant, were to be rejected because they did not believe what she said by comparison to the denials made the male principal concerned.

2.	As we read their decision, the principal reason why they found her evidence to be untruthful related to what she said had happened surrounding a visit on 22nd August 1997 to a hotel in Dorridge. It was her case that she and a friend had arranged to go out for a drive and have a drink and possibly go to a night-club thereafter and that they happened across a hotel called Forest Hotel in Dorridge where, by coincidence, they met up with a number of people including the first respondent. It is clear from the evidence, which was accepted by the tribunal, that at that location, relations between the applicant and the person who she said was guilty of sexual harassment against her were, at the least, friendly. The evidence appeared to show that they had a somewhat close relationship kissing, cuddling and so on during that evening.

3.	The tribunal concluded that the suggestion that the appellant and her friend had happened across this hotel by accident and that it was pure coincidence that she met up there with the first respondent, was to be rejected, not least because the hotel is not easy to find.

4.	There was also evidence that after they had been at the hotel for some time, according to the respondent they went to a curry house and had a curry afterwards. That was denied by the appellant, yet the manager of the curry house was called who could recall the party there.

5.	For those reasons, the tribunal obviously took the view that the appellant’s evidence was not to be believed wherever it conflicted with that given by on and behalf of the respondents

6.	The grounds of appeal are firstly that the appellant considered that she was to be given a full-time Chairman or Regional Chairman for the determination of her complaint, whereas she only had a part-time Chairman. It seems to us that there is no merit in that point. The question at issue is whether the decision is a sound one in law. It seems to us that a part-time Chairman is as competent to give a sound decision as a Regional or full-time Chairman, unless or until it is shown to the contrary.

7.	Secondly, she says that the tribunal’s decision did not deal with a large number of particular incidents. That, she says, was wrong. She takes the point that the fact that her evidence was firmly rejected in relation to the incident which I have described, did not mean that she was not to be believed about all the other matters that she spoke about. 

8.	It seems to us that those contentions are questions of fact and relate to the weight of evidence which must be determined by the fact finding tribunal. The tribunal is not obliged to deal with each and every incident which has been alleged in a case such as this; where the whole tenor of the appellant’s evidence was being rejected. It was being rejected because the tribunal was prepared to accept that she was not a victim of unwelcome treatment.

9.	The appellant said that the respondent and the firm had put pressure on her and her witnesses and that her main witness who was called spoke about it and also pressure had been applied to people working in the firm. There was a culture of fear which, she said, was raised at the tribunal yet not dealt with in their decision.

10.	Again, that was a point which was raised before the tribunal, no doubt they will have decided whether it amounted to anything or not. As we have already said, they are not obliged to deal with every point that has been raised. Their decision must be a credible one based on the main events that took place. We are not prepared to infer that they have overlooked other incidents of a less important nature.

11.	Accordingly, we are satisfied that the appeal which is raised in this case seems to us to be an appeal arguing or seeking to reargue the facts and the weight to be given to the evidence which was given on either side. Those are not points of law. We are satisfied that the Notice of Appeal does not raise any arguable point of law and it must, in those circumstances, be dismissed.