Appeal No.	EAT/1366/96

EMPLOYMENT APPEAL TRIBUNAL
58 VICTORIA EMBANKMENT, LONDON EC4Y 0DS

	At the Tribunal
	On 13 July 1998

Before
HIS HONOUR JUDGE PETER CLARK
MR J R CROSBY
MR R JACKSON

MR P SOOD	APPELLANT

AQUAPAL LTD	RESPONDENTS

Transcript of Proceedings

JUDGMENT

PRELIMINARY HEARING 

Revised

	APPEARANCES

For the Appellant	MR GALBRAITH MARTIN
(of Counsel)
Appearing under the
Employment Law Appeal
Advice Scheme	

	JUDGE PETER CLARK:     This preliminary hearing was adjourned by a division of this Tribunal (Judge Levy QC) presiding on 2 May 1997 so that the Appellant, Mr Sood, could swear and file an affidavit, and the Industrial Tribunal Chairman at London (South) be invited to comment on that affidavit and to provide his Notes of Evidence.

	We have the affidavit and the Chairman’s Notes of what took place on the two days of the hearing in this case, 18 April and 4 October 1996, but not his comments on that affidavit which we see from the file was sent in copy form for his attention on 25 June 1997.  The Notes of Evidence were received at this Tribunal on 14 May 1998, hence the delay in relisting this preliminary hearing.

	The potential question of law raised by the appeal relates to the proper use of the procedure, first included in paragraph 13 (2) (e) of the Industrial Tribunals (Constitution and Rules of Procedure) Regulations 1993, whereby a claim may be struck out on the grounds that the manner in which the proceedings had been conducted, in this case by the Appellant, has been scandalous.

	What happened here was that at the first hearing held on 18 April 1996 the Appellant denied in evidence that he had signed a purported letter of resignation from his employment with the Respondent, Aquapal Ltd, dated 1 July 1995.  At the end of the first day the Tribunal directed that that letter should be sent for forensic examination.

	At the start of the second day of hearing on 4 October 1996, Counsel for the Respondent submitted, on the basis of the forensic report which apparently found that the signature was genuinely that of the Appellant, and had been written over his printed name on the document, that the claim should be struck out under Rule 13 (2) (e) without more.  The Industrial Tribunal acceded to that application.  It followed that the claim was struck out before the Appellant had a full opportunity to cross-examine Mr Anthony, the witness for the Respondent who produced the resignation letter, which he said had been signed in his presence by the Appellant on 19 July 1995.

	The provenance of the letter was questionable, as the Industrial Tribunal observed at paragraph 9 of their extended reasons dated 17 October 1996; however, Mr Anthony was not required to deal with those questions by way of full cross-examination.

	Our provisional view is that Rule 13 (2) (e) was arguably designed to deal specifically with disruptive behaviour by a party during an Industrial Tribunal hearing:  compare O’Keefe v Southampton City Council [1988] ICR 419; not to provide a short cut to resolving highly contentious factual issues.

	In these circumstances we shall permit the matter to proceed to a full appeal hearing.  The Chairman is again asked to provide his comments on the Appellant’s affidavit sworn on 24 June 1997 at his earliest convenience.  The case should be listed for a half day hearing; Category C, skeleton arguments to be exchanged between the parties not less than 14 days before the date fixed for the full appeal hearing and copies of those skeleton arguments to be lodged timeously at this Tribunal.