Appeal No.	 EAT/439/97

EMPLOYMENT APPEAL TRIBUNAL
58 VICTORIA EMBANKMENT, LONDON EC4Y 0DS

	At the Tribunal
	On 31 October 1997

Before
THE HONOURABLE MR JUSTICE MAURICE KAY	
MR K M HACK JP
MRS T A MARSLAND

MISS D WILLIS	APPELLANT

MARS CONFECTIONARY	RESPONDENTS

Transcript of Proceedings

JUDGMENT

PRELIMINARY HEARING

Revised

	APPEARANCES

For the Appellant	NO APPEARANCE BY
OR REPRESENTATION
ON BEHALF OF
THE APPELLANT	

	MR JUSTICE MAURICE KAY:     The appeal in this case was listed for preliminary hearing today.  Notice of hearing has been sent to Miss Willis.  It has not been returned to the court as generally happens if there has been a change of address.  The court has two telephone numbers for her, one, upon use by the court staff today produced the response, through Telecom, that it was not available, the other (thought to be Miss Willis’ home) produced no reply.

	Accordingly, we have had to consider what to do with her appeal today.  She made application to the Industrial Tribunal under the Sex Discrimination Act.  She worked for Mars Confectionary for a period of about 18 months, coming to an end in February 1996.  It is clear from that that she did not qualify under unfair dismissal legislation or for some other employment rights.  However, she was eligible to make a claim for sex discrimination.  Her claim fell under numerous headings and gave rise to a hearing in the Industrial Tribunal at Reading that lasted some six days spread over a period of three months.  The upshot was that the Tribunal dismissed her claim.  It is not necessary for us to recite the particular incidents of which she was complaining.  We observe in passing that the decision is some 13 typed pages long and deals in considerable detail with all her complaints.  She appeals to this Appeal Tribunal and her grounds of appeal, as set out, are in two paragraphs.

	The first asserts that during the proceedings it emerged that the Respondents had knowingly and deliberately failed to comply with an earlier order for full discovery of relevant documents prior to the hearing and she complains about the length of time that she had with documents and the time at which they emerged in the hearing.

	The second is not a ground of appeal at all but simply states:

“I am unable to detail the various other points of law which arose out of this procedural defect at this time as my advisers are on annual leave.”

That document is date-stamped some five months ago.  

	Having perused the ground of appeal that she does put forward and having matched it against the decision which she is seeking to overturn, it is abundantly obvious to us that she has no arguable point of law that could possibly result in the decision of the Industrial Tribunal being overturned at a full hearing.  

	In those circumstances we deal with the case in her absence and her appeal is hereby dismissed.