Appeal No.	 EAT/1263/96

EMPLOYMENT APPEAL TRIBUNAL
58 VICTORIA EMBANKMENT, LONDON EC4Y 0DS

	At the Tribunal
	On 19 February 1997

Before
HIS HONOUR JUDGE D PUGSLEY
MR L D COWAN
MRS M T PROSSER

DR A ADOKO	APPELLANT

MR HUSSEIN JEMAL	RESPONDENT

Transcript of Proceedings

JUDGMENT

PRELIMINARY HEARING - EX PARTE

Revised

	APPEARANCES

For the Appellant	THE APPELLANT IN PERSON	

	JUDGE PUGSLEY:   In the case Dr Adoko who has informed us that he has been in practice as a member of the Bar and is about to become a solicitor, brings an application appealing against an order made for costs against him by an Industrial Tribunal at London (North) under the chairmanship of Mr Goodman. 

	In view of the nature of the allegations made, we think it is worth noting what that tribunal decided. The unanimous decision of the tribunal was that:

“(1)The Applicant’s complaint that he is owed the sum of £254.33 by the Respondent be dismissed on withdrawal by the Applicant.
(2) The Applicant’s complaint that he is entitled to interest on that amount be dismissed.
(3) The Applicant’s request for a declaration that the Respondent has committed a breach of professional undertaking be dismissed on withdrawal by the Applicant.
(4) An application for costs by the Applicant against the Respondent be dismissed.
(5) The Applicant be ordered to contribute the sum of £150 towards the Respondent’s costs to be paid to the Respondent on or before 22 September 1996.”

	The tribunal gave extended reasons for that decision, and they then went on to consider the question of costs At paragraph 8 they say as follows:

“8	In response to this submission the Applicant maintained he was entitled to pursue the proceedings following receipt of the cheque for the following reasons:
(a) 	He regarded the letter which accompanied the cheque as objectionable and insulting because the letter did not contain any admission of liability and implied that the reason for payment was that the Respondent did not wish to take time off work to attend the hearing.
(b)	 The Respondent had made untruthful assertions in his Notice of Appearance and the Applicant had a duty to expose those alleged untruths to the Tribunal.
(c)	 In the circumstances it was inappropriate for the Respondent to seek costs against the Applicant and unfair for the Applicant to be penalised simply for trying to expose the Respondent’s untruthful submissions.”

	In paragraph 9 the tribunal summed the matter up in this way:

“9 The Tribunal do not regard any of these explanations as justifying the Applicant’s determination to pursue his complaints any further following receipt of the cheque from the Respondent. It was evident from the way in which the Applicant presented his submissions and from the background history of other complaints made by the Applicant against the Respondent that the Applicant was pursuing a crusade against the Respondent in an attempt to obtain some formal and official vindication of the Applicant’s integrity. As a qualified lawyer the Applicant should have realised that Industrial Tribunals are not an appropriate platform to pursue this sort of grievance and that once the Applicant had received payment of all monies which he was claiming there was no need for him to pursue this matter any further to a full hearing. By doing so the Applicant acted in a vexatious and frivolous manner and is therefore ordered to contribute £150 towards the Respondent’s costs. In this context, although the Respondent himself is a solicitor, the Tribunal regard it as entirely reasonable for the Respondent to have engaged Counsel to represent the Respondent on the hearing today.”

	We have listened to what Dr Adoko has said. We have read carefully his grounds of appeal, and we have read carefully his skeleton argument. During the course of the hearing both members of this tribunal repeatedly put to the appellant, as did at a later stage the presiding judge of this tribunal, that central finding by the tribunal that as a qualified lawyer the applicant should have realised that Industrial Tribunals are not an appropriate platform to pursue this sort of grievance, and that once he had been paid there was no need for him to pursue this matter any further to a full hearing. We cannot say at any stage that we received an answer that we found satisfactory to that simple proposition. It seems to us that we have to look at this case in the context of the particular rule, that we have done, and we consider that it was open in the discretion of the tribunal to make the order they did. 

	We cannot accept that it was a case where this should properly be argued before a full tribunal. We are making no finding as to whether or not any of the allegations made are right, or whether they are wrong. The whole point is that the Industrial Tribunal was not the place to pursue those allegations. We strongly deprecate the suggestion that a tribunal set up under Act of Parliament with specific and discrete powers should be used for a totally different purpose and to pursue matters which are not within the jurisdiction of the tribunal. We cannot ignore the fact that the appellant was professionally qualified. We note that it was a decision made unanimously by a tribunal, in our view it was a decision within their discretion and no issue of law arises. The appeal is dismissed.