Appeal No.	 EAT/111/97

EMPLOYMENT APPEAL TRIBUNAL
58 VICTORIA EMBANKMENT, LONDON EC4Y 0DS

	At the Tribunal
	On 18 April 1997

Before
HIS HONOUR JUDGE D M LEVY QC
DR D GRIEVES CBE
MR R JACKSON

MR A DICKENS	APPELLANT

THE RIVERSIDE CENTRE LTD	RESPONDENTS

Transcript of Proceedings

JUDGMENT

PRELIMINARY HEARING

Revised

	APPEARANCES

For the Appellant	IN PERSON	

	JUDGE D M LEVY QC:     This is an unfortunate case.  Mr Dickens had a number of short-term contracts with the Riverside Centre Ltd (“the Respondent”). At the end of what was the final one, the Respondent notified Mr Dickens that they were not going to employ him again.  He commenced proceedings by an Originating Application to the Industrial Tribunal, received there on 22 June 1996, complaining of unfair dismissal, redundancy, sex discrimination, and breach of contract.  The Respondent’s Appearance received on 31 July 1996, said Mr Dickens was dismissed at the end of [a] fixed term contract.

	The matter came before the Industrial Tribunal sitting at Southampton on 30 September 1996.  The name of the Respondent was correctly identified.  The unanimous decision of the Tribunal was that all the applications of Mr Dickens failed because he did not have the right not to be unfairly dismissed; that he was not dismissed on the grounds of redundancy; he was not dismissed in breach of contract and he was not unlawfully discriminated against on the grounds of his sex.

	The reasons for that were given in Extended Reasons sent to the parties on 9 December 1996.  Essentially the main reason for the failure of Mr Dickens’ case is that found in paragraphs 6 and 7 of the Reasons.  Paragraph 6 sets out the relevant terms of the contract, including the waiver of rights provision contained in section 142 of the Employment Protection (Consolidation) Act 1978.

	Paragraph 7 inter alia provides:

“7.  It would appear that Mr Dickens signed the [what was the final] contract on 6 April 1995 and the general manager on 7 April 1995.  However we find that it is this contract which forms Mr Dickens’ last contract of employment with his employers.  ...”

	On 31 March 1996, at the end of the term of that contract there was no new contract offered.

	Paragraph 11 of the Extended Reasons reads:

“11.  The respondents have not sought to justify the fairness of the dismissal and if there is not a valid exclusion clause there would inevitably be a finding of unfair dismissal.”

	The rest of the reasons set out why, in the opinion of the Industrial Tribunal, this was a fixed term contract with a valid exclusion clause, i.e. one which entitled the Respondent in the circumstances to behave exactly as it did. 

	We have listened to the submissions which Mr Dickens, who has appeared before us in person, has made today.  There is nothing in those submissions which in any way make us think that the decision in law, which the Tribunal reached, was wrong.  Unfortunately, what Mr Dickens wants is the law to be changed.  We can well understand that, but the terms of the contract he made with the Respondent were such that he has no rights under the present legislation.

	In our judgment the decision below was impeccable and this appeal must fail.  We therefore dismiss it at this stage.

	We thank Mr Dickens for his careful, courteous and patient submissions.