Appeal No.	EAT/1051/96

EMPLOYMENT APPEAL TRIBUNAL
58 VICTORIA EMBANKMENT, LONDON EC4Y 0DS

	At the Tribunal
	On 3 November 1997

Before
THE HONOURABLE MR JUSTICE MORISON (PRESIDENT)
MR R JACKSON
MR R H PHIPPS

MR J SANDERSON	APPELLANT

FARNELL ELECTRONIC COMPONENTS PLC	RESPONDENTS

Transcript of Proceedings

JUDGMENT

PRELIMINARY HEARING - EX PARTE

Revised

	APPEARANCES

For the Appellant	THE APPELLANT IN PERSON	

	MR JUSTICE MORISON (PRESIDENT):     The purpose of this hearing is to determine whether Mr Sanderson has an arguable point of law in relation to an appeal he wishes to make against a tribunal’s decision following a hearing at Leeds on Monday, 17th June 1996. By their decision the tribunal unanimously concluded that his application for unfair dismissal brought against his former employers, Farnell Electronic Components PLC, was out of time and that it was reasonably practicable for it to have been presented within time; and secondly, that it would indeed have had no jurisdiction to hear the application in any event because he had entered into a compromise agreement which satisfied the provisions of s.140 of the 1978 Act.

	Mr Sanderson had been employed in a senior capacity with the company for many years. He was a well regarded employee, and his dismissal came as a shock to him, particularly bearing in mind that he was given no inkling as to the reason why he was being dismissed. It would appear that he was dismissed following a merger, and it is still a mystery to him as to why it was that it was concluded that his face no longer fitted in a company with whom he had been associated for very many years. But he was dismissed in October 1994 and there was then a discussion between the parties as to the share option scheme and Mr Sanderson’s rights under it.

	The former employers were threatening to take up a position which would effectively prevent him from taking up certain of his options. It seemed clear to Mr Sanderson that this was not a course which the company were entitled to pursue and he sensibly took advice from a solicitor who then entered into negotiations with the company. The effect of those negotiations was that technically he was re-instated on 14th December but solely for the purpose of enabling the company then to treat him on the basis of being an early retiree. That device enabled him to have the benefit of the share option scheme.

	The compromise agreement was concluded on 14th December. We have a copy of it in our papers. It was signed by all the parties and was expressed to be in full and final settlement. It referred to the fact that Mr Sanderson was confirming that the agreement was dealing, in particular, with his complaint of unfair dismissal and it was compromising his complaint on the basis of independent legal advice from a solicitor who was a qualified lawyer within the meaning of s.140(3) of the Act, and who had explained to him the significance of the agreement.

	It seems to us very clear that the Industrial Tribunal were correct to conclude that that agreement met the requirements specified in s.140. 

	Following that agreement, Mr Sanderson reflected on his position, and felt that he had been deprived of an opportunity of airing his grievance about the way that he had been dismissed. No doubt he was of the view that the Industrial Tribunal proceedings themselves would help him to understand why it was that the company had decided that he should cease to be employed.

	He understood perfectly well the nature of the compromise agreement that he had made, but was of the view that the company was seeking to take advantage in the negotiations of its own prospective wrong-doing, namely its refusal to honour the terms of the share option scheme. He therefore wondered whether it might be possible to argue that the agreement was no longer binding on him as it had been entered into by duress.

	He tell us, and we accept, that he spoke to an ACAS official about this, and following that discussion he presented his application to an Industrial Tribunal for unfair dismissal which was of course well out of time. 

	The Industrial Tribunal indicated that even if it had been competent for them to hear the complaint, they would have ruled it out of time because even taking the commencement of time most favourable to Mr Sanderson, he presented his complaint more than three months thereafter.

	On the question of duress, the Industrial Tribunal came to the conclusion that economic duress had not been established in this case. They placed, and understandably placed, great reliance upon the fact that Mr Sanderson was in receipt of professional legal advice at the time when the agreement was entered into. 

	Their findings on duress are set out in paragraph 6 of their decision. It seems to us that there was nothing wrong with the tribunal’s approach on this issue. We have no grounds for believing that there is an arguable point of law on this aspect of the matter either.

	Accordingly, it seems to us that this is a case where the Industrial Tribunal’s decision cannot be faulted in law. Our jurisdiction is to review tribunal decisions only where there is an error of law. We can find none in this case, and therefore, we are bound to dismiss this appeal.