Appeal No. EAT/685/93
	I N T E R N A L 

	EMPLOYMENT APPEAL TRIBUNAL
	58 VICTORIA EMBANKMENT, LONDON EC4Y 0DS

		At the Tribunal
		On 12 April 1994

	Before

	HIS HONOUR JUDGE J HULL QC

	MRS M L BOYLE

	MR J H GALBRAITH

MR R ODELL	APPELLANT

LING DYNAMIC SYSTEMS LTD	RESPONDENTS

	Transcript of Proceedings

	JUDGMENT

	PRELIMINARY HEARING 

Revised

	APPEARANCES

For the Appellant	IN PERSON

	

	JUDGE HULL QC:  In this case Mr Odell, who has appeared before us in person, appeals against a decision of the Industrial Tribunal which was promulgated on 28 July 1993.  He complained to that Tribunal that he had been unfairly dismissed and we have of course all read the decision of the Tribunal from which it appears there was unhappily a very fraught and unhappy situation between Mr Odell and a woman member of the staff at the Company, the Respondents.

	Mr Odell is a gentleman who is expert in computers.  Apparently this woman had made remarks seriously derogatory of Mr Odell in a way which brought them to the attention of Mr Odell's wife and that led him to have very hard feelings against this woman; as a result he and this woman did not speak to each other.  That situation went on for years.  We do not need to go into the details and of course we assume for the purposes of the appeal that that was a well justified complaint by Mr Odell but it led to all sorts of difficulties.  Inevitably if one member of an organisation is not on speaking terms with another difficulties may arise, and they did in this case according to the Respondents.  Numerous attempts were made to put matters right if they could be, and evidence was given about that.  The Tribunal say at paragraph 16:

		"We find that the reason for the dismissal was the applicant's repeated failure to comply with a reasonable requirement of the respondents.  The respondents, despite the regrettable tolerance of the failure of communication for a long period, were entitled, in view of computerisation and the new system of operations, to require a proper communication between the parties concerned at least over business matters."

In other words, although relationships might of course be very cool and formal, they were entitled, said the Industrial Tribunal, to insist that there should be communication between these two people whatever had passed on some social occasion, as apparently it had.

	It was of course for the Tribunal to decide exactly what had happened, so far as they needed to:  where the truth lay, all the facts, and then they were entitled again, it was their prerogative and their duty, to decide what those facts added up to and what inferences they should draw.

	We are entitled to interfere with their decision only if there is an error of law.  That is what Parliament has said and it is for Parliament and not, of course, for us to say what our jurisdiction is.  We are not entitled to go again into the facts and to say we would have found other facts differently; nor can we criticise the Tribunal for finding these facts on the evidence and say we might have reached a different decision.  We are not allowed to do that and we have to concentrate on whether there are any points of law.  When a Tribunal finds the facts it is only obliged to find those facts on which its decision depends and even then only the most important of them.  It is not obliged to set out all the evidence which it has heard, or all that part of the evidence which it has rejected.  Here, the Tribunal heard Mr Odell.  It heard, as is set out in its decision, Mr Phillips who was called as a witness and whom Mr Odell tells us altered his evidence from what he told Mr Odell it was going to be.  They also heard from the other side Mr Williams, joint managing director, and Mr Jones the customer services manager who were responsible between them for the decision to dismiss; that of course is the essential matter which the Tribunal has to consider when it is considering whether the dismissal is fair or unfair.

	Mr Odell appeals and because it appeared to the officer of this Tribunal that there was no point of law discernable, this was set down under our special procedure to see whether we could, with Mr Odell's assistance, discover any point of law here.  First of all Mr Odell summarises very helpfully his main points.  He says there was no evidence to support the facts found.  Indeed Mr Odell accused his employers of acting in bad faith throughout and having a systematic practice of dismissing people, not in good faith but under the guise of restructuring or redundancy and he had given the Tribunal lists of employees who, he said, had been treated in this way.

	The Tribunal observed at paragraph 15:

		"We have no evidence of the facts of each dismissal"

	Plainly, anybody reading that with any knowledge of industrial tribunals and of this Tribunal would say  - well there they are saying we cannot go into the facts; we cannot judge perhaps 20, 30 or 50 other cases in addition to this one.  They did of course have evidence that there had been these dismissals because Mr Odell had prepared a list, but they were not entitled in our view, as a matter of law, to try the reputation of the Company and find that it had generally been a bad employer or a good employer.  If it had to do that by reference to a number of cases there would be no end to the Tribunal's enquiry.  They were right, in our view, to say that they had no evidence concerning the facts of each individual case which had been put before them and right not to look for such evidence because, as a matter of law, they were concerned not with trying the reputation of the parties but the fairness or unfairness of this dismissal of Mr Odell.

	Mr Odell then says that this was a perverse decision because the Tribunal ignored evidence which was put before them.  He says that he does not believe that they considered the facts as presented to them.

	They did in fact have several bundles of documents put before them.  They adjourned the hearing for nearly three weeks and considered it further when further documents were evidently put before them.

	We have said that no Tribunal is bound to set out all the facts and the evidence which were given to it.  What it has to do is to state, perhaps quite shortly, the basis on which it acts and if it does so, and sets out shortly the findings of fact, it cannot be criticised.  Of course some Tribunals think it right to set out the evidence (or much of it) which they have heard and then say exactly what they make of it, that is entirely a matter for them; but a Tribunal which states, as this one did, what their findings of facts were and what evidence they heard, that is to say the witnesses whom they heard, is not to be criticised because it does not set out all those matters which it rejected as well as those matters which it accepted.

	Finally, and this is really involved with his second point, Mr Odell complains of bias.  He did not at first say there was a conspiracy but he did write to the Tribunal saying that there was conspiracy by the Company; that there was a campaign against him.  He says that the Industrial Tribunal treated this as something of a joke.  He says that the Tribunal showed that it was biased against him and he invites our attention to a letter (page 14 of the bundle) in which the Chairman very shortly says it was sad that Mr Odell thought there was a conspiracy against him.

	An allegation of bias is a serious matter.  Clearly any litigant in person is likely to feel if matters go against him that he has not has the favourable hearing that he would wish and it is difficult for anybody to accept that something which they say on oath is rejected by a Court or Tribunal, but unhappily of course it does happen every day.

	We can find no evidence of bias here.  It appears to us that the decision of the Tribunal is a perfectly ordinary decision in which the evidence of the managers of the company was basically accepted and it followed, of course, that the suggestions made by Mr Odell about prejudice and conspiracy against him, and the evidence which he adduced, were not accepted as showing that there was constructed case against him. 

	The fact is there were two sides to this.  The Tribunal of course had to hear both sides and it appears to us that it did hear both sides.  Allegations of bias are easy to make.  Here the Chairman had the support of two members, each experienced in industrial matters.  We have seen absolutely nothing to make us think that the Tribunal was biased, however sincerely Mr Odell believes that it was.  It was for the Tribunal to say whether Mr Odell's belief that the Company also was biased and prejudiced against him was correct or not.  They have done so in the sense unfavourable to Mr Odell.

	We can only entertain appeals if there is a point of law.  We cannot find here, in what has been laid before us very courteously by Mr Odell, any errors or any bias or any point of law which could properly be raised in front of us.  It is trite to say that a decision which depends on facts and on the hearing of witnesses may go one way or may go the other.  The fact that it went against Mr Odell and that evidence on which he relied was rejected does not show any bias; does not show of itself any error of law; and we therefore, with reluctance, because of Mr Odell's courtesy and patience, have to say that we do not think that this appeal can proceed and it must therefore be dismissed.