Appeal No. EAT/206/93
	I N T E R N A L

	EMPLOYMENT APPEAL TRIBUNAL
	58 VICTORIA EMBANKMENT, LONDON EC4Y 0DS

		At the Tribunal
		On 26th March 1993

	Before

	THE HONOURABLE MR JUSTICE WOOD MC (P)

	MR G H GALBRAITH CB

	MRS P TURNER OBE

ROYAL BROMPTON HOSPITAL	APPELLANTS

MR P BELCHER	RESPONDENT

	Transcript of Proceedings

	JUDGMENT

Revised

	APPEARANCES

For the Appellants	MR M WHINCUP
Legal Representative
Keele University
(Dept of Law)
Keele
Staffs
ST5 5BG

For the Respondent	MR C G HUGHES
Solicitor
Legal Dept
BMA
BMA House
Tavistock Square
LONDON

	MR JUSTICE WOOD (PRESIDENT):  This is an appeal on a decision of a learned Chairman in London (North) refusing to vacate two dates which had been set for the hearing of a case, namely Friday 30th April and Tuesday 4th May.

	This whole matter has a somewhat unfortunate history in that the Applicant is a qualified medical practitioner, he was a Registrar at the Royal Brompton Hospital in London, and he is alleging that the Hospital were in breach of a contract to allow him to remain on.  He seeks therefore, as I understand it broadly, to become a consultant and he is seeking re-instatement or re-engagement.

	 The date of dismissal was the 31st December 1991.  There was a hearing fixed for the 7th September 1992, that had to be adjourned because of the illness of the Chairman.  There was further date fixed on the 21st December, that was cancelled at some three day's notice because, as we all know London (South) Region was moving to Croydon.

	 The next decision was to transfer the case to London (North);  it was transferred before any date was fixed.  There was an enquiry in the early part of this year about convenient dates.  It is said by Mr Whincup that he told them that he was not available between the end of March and the end of June.  He can not produce any document about this, and we have seen no document, it may be that there was some misunderstanding.  However, the matter has clearly been looked into by the learned Chairman after he received a long letter dated 9th March from Mr Whincup.  That sets out the history and it also sets out his arguments which he has presented to us today.  In essence those arguments are, that he will be away from the end of March until the end of June in Germany, where he is contracted to give some lectures, and he has produced documents from Germany indicating that he has that engagement.  I see it is to give a course of lectures of about 30 hours during those three months.  Secondly, he says, therefore he who has represented the Hospital, will be unable to be at the hearing, that he charges very little by way of fee and if he was not there the fees would be vastly increased.  His third point is the inconvenience to the Hospital on those two days.  We imagine that that is because of the two points we have already made, and that there would therefore be an injustice;  that expedition is always important but nevertheless the question of costs is even more important in the present case and the Hospital would in any event pay interest on any monetary award of compensation that was made.  He has referred us to a number of cases each of which concern the question of parallel proceedings in industrial tribunals and the High Court.  All those matters no doubt went through the mind of the learned Chairman when balancing the decision.  Here, the Applicant Mr Belcher, through no fault of his, is awaiting a decision where he is seeking re-instatement or re-engagement.  The balancing exercise, therefore, had to be carried out by the learned Chairman.  It may be in these days of modern travel that Mr Whincup will be able to travel from Germany, wherever it is, maybe Hamburg, in almost the same time that it might take him to travel from the Midlands;  we know not, no doubt his accommodation would be available to him here and the cost of his ticket, would no doubt, be the only additional cost that we can see that might be incurred.  Otherwise he could no doubt make arrangements to be here over the weekend concerned for those two days of hearing.

	Balancing all that out, as no doubt the learned Chairman did, it seems to us that it is quite impossible to say here that there was a failure to exercise a judicial discretion appropriately.  We are quite unable to see any grounds on which it could be argued that the learned Chairman simply went beyond his powers or exercised his powers in such a way that on the Wednesbury rules we can say it was an improper use of his discretion.

	It follows, therefore, that this appeal must be dismissed.