Appeal No. EAT/615/91

	EMPLOYMENT APPEAL TRIBUNAL
	58 VICTORIA EMBANKMENT, LONDON EC4Y 0DS

		At the Tribunal
		On 14 May 1992

	Before

	THE HONOURABLE MR JUSTICE WOOD MC (P)

	MR A D SCOTT

MR R SENTHILNATHAN	APPELLANT

BRITISH AIRWAYS PLC	RESPONDENTS

	Transcript of Proceedings

	JUDGMENT

	PRELIMINARY 

Revised

	APPEARANCES

For the Appellant	IN PERSON

	

	MR JUSTICE WOOD (PRESIDENT):  This is an Appeal by the Applicant against a decision of an Industrial Tribunal sitting in London North on 5 September 1991 under the chairmanship of The Hon F R Davies, which held that proceedings issued under the Race Relations Act 1975 and dated 26 February 1991 were out of time under Section 68(1) of the Act and refused to exercise its discretion to extend time under Section 68(6).  The issue before us is as to the exercise of the discretion under the latter sub-section. 

	The Tribunal deal with the facts and their discretion very succinctly in paragraph 5 where they say:
"From the oral and written evidence we found the following facts.  In early June 1989 the Applicant contacted the Council for Racial Equality with a view to their assisting him in bringing a complaint of racial discrimination to an industrial tribunal.  On 12 June 1989 the CRE acknowledged his application.  On 25 July 1989 the CRE wrote to the Applicant saying that they had decided not to assist him but that he was of course free to go on without them if he so wished, and might care to instruct a solicitor.  The Applicant went to a solicitor and had a conference with counsel..."

	After that had taken place, on 16 August 1989 an Originating Application was presented by the Solicitor, presumably on the advice of Counsel, alleging unfair dismissal and sex discrimination.  There was no reference to racial discrimination.  The Tribunal infer from those facts:
"It is clear that the legal experts thought it inappropriate to raise a complaint of racial discrimination."
	That initial application was heard.  It was found by a majority that the Applicant had been fairly dismissed.  There was an Appeal to this Court.  At both those hearings the Applicant was represented by Counsel.  The Appeal was dismissed by an Order of this Court on 7 February 1991 and we have seen the judgment of Mr Justice Tucker given on that occasion.   It was after that that the application was made which was being considered in the present case namely by a letter on 26 February 1991.  Clearly this Tribunal sitting in September 1991 was acting well within its discretion in deciding that it was not just and equitable in all the circumstances to extend time.  They say this in paragraph 6:
"It may be that the legal experts made a misjudgment and that a complaint of racial discrimination would have been appropriate.  We do not say that that is so; only that it may be so.  It is clear law that if a person goes to a legal expert that expert makes a misjudgment the person (the Applicant) is bound by the expert's action or inaction.

	We find that is not just and equitable that this complaint of racial discrimination should be heard."
	They therefore do not extend time.  

	We are quite unable to find any error in law in the exercise of that discretion and it follows in the circumstances that this Appeal must be dismissed and it is at this stage.