THE HIGH COURT
JUDICIAL REVIEW
			No. 203 JR/2001
IN THE MATTER OF THE ILLEGAL IMMIGRANTS (TRAFFICKING ACT) 2000 AND IN THE MATTER OF THE IMMIGRATION ACT, 1999 
BETWEEN
O.                  J.
APPLICANT
AND 
THE MINISTER FOR JUSTICE EQUALITY AND LAW REFORM
RESPONDENT
Judgment of Justice T C Smyth delivered the 15th day of January 2002
	The Applicant is a single male person of Nigerian nationality who is of Christian belief and whose date of birth is 23rd November 1978.  He arrived in the State on the 7th August 2000 having travelled, in a not wholly accounted for fashion via Malta to Ireland.  In the standard form of Questionnaire applicable to these matters he states he had primary and secondary education and was from 1995 - 2000 an undergraduate of the University of Ibadan but received no qualifications, noting in the Questionnaire “Uncompleted Programme due to crisis”.  An interview with the Applicant took place on the 13 of September 2000, and the interviewer one Pierce O’Flynn made a report thereon which on its face is dated 24th September 2000.  The conclusion arrived at was that the application was manifestly unfounded under paragraph 14 Sections (a), (b) and (c) of the  Hope Hanlon procedures (viz):- 
	“14. The grounds on which it may be determined that an application is manifestly unfounded are as follows:-
		(a) It does not show on its face any grounds for the contention that the Applicant is a refugee,
		(b) The Applicant gave clearly insufficient details or evidence to substantiate the application,
		(c) The Applicant’s reason for leaving or not returning to his or her country of nationality does not relate to a fear of persecution.”

	A Mr. Joseph Keaney, Assistant Principal Officer of the Asylum Division of the Respondent’s Department (has sworn an Affidavit in these proceedings on the 4th of December 2001, which explains to my satisfaction the confusion of dates on the documentation between 22nd and 25th September 2000) who considered  the recommendation of the case worker (who I am satisfied from Mr. Keaney’s affidavit was one Mr. Pierce O’Flynn) and agreed with it.  However, he confined his decision to paragraph 14(b) of the Hope Hanlon procedures.  This he did via a letter which on its face is dated the 22nd September informing the Applicant that:- 
	“The grounds on which your application has been determined as manifestly unfounded are as follows :
You gave clearly insufficient details or evidence to substantiate the application.”

	The entitlement to appeal this decision was availed of by the Applicant who had the benefit of legal advice and assistance in the person of one Marie Quirke of the Refugee Legal Service who has addressed the issue of the refusal in considerable detail.  The letter concludes:
 “7. This Applicant has demonstrated on the face of it grounds for the contention that he is a refugee.  He answered all the questions he was asked.  Its is submitted impossible for the Applicant to do any more.  If the Department are of the view that there are insufficient details this should be put to the Applicant.  It is not the role for  me as his legal advisor to explain his claim and it is not the role of the Appeal Authority to decide on a case without all the facts having been gleaned by the Department in a comprehensive and adequate manner that respects natural justice.
8.    This appeal is without prejudice to Judicial Review if the Appeal Authority decides not to require the Department to substantively examine this case in a manner that respects natural justice constitutes a substantive examination of the claim.”  
Parenthetically I note the observations made in the course of paragraph 7 indicate an approach to these matters that is more appropriate to an adversarial scheme of things, as in the case of a lis inter partes.  The approach is at variance with that as pronounced by the Supreme Court in the Illegal Immigrants (Trafficking) Bill, 1999 [2000]  2 I.R. 360 at 395 which has to the following effect:-
	“It must be observed that a person seeking asylum or refugee status is the Applicant for that status.  There is an administrative procedure in place to carry out and assist him or her in the processing of that application.  He or she is not a passive participant in that process.” 
	(Emphasis added)

	 It is important to note that this letter of appeal was written in the knowledge that the appeal would be decided on the papers available in the case and on any written submissions that might be made by the Applicant or on his behalf.  To assist in the preparation of the appeal, a copy of all documents on which the decision to refuse the application was based were furnished to the Applicant who was also advised (in the letter which on its face is dated 22nd September 2000):- 
	“Your submission should set out the grounds on which your appeal is based  	and should also contain any further relevant information which you may wish to submit to support your case.”  
	And
	“If you intend to avail of legal representation for an appeal, either from the Refugee Legal Service or privately, it is important that you give these documents to that legal representative as soon as possible to ensure that your appeal and any supporting documentation be lodged within the seven working day time limit.”
	(Emphasis added)

	Thus it was clear that prior to the appeal, the view being taken by the Respondent was that there was insufficient detail or evidence to substantiate his claim.  In the events the Appeals Authority considered the appeal and by recommendation dated 6th October 2000 it expressed its decision in this way:-
	“Decision:
	I have considered all the documentation on the Appellant’s file together with the submission made in writing by the Refugee Legal Service, dated 3rd of October 2000 on behalf of the Appellant and find that in the absence of further information I am satisfied that the Appellant’s claim for refugee status is manifestly unfounded pursuant to paragraph 14 (b) of the procedures for processing asylum claims.  Accordingly, I recommend that this appeal be dismissed.”

	The outcome of the foregoing was that by letter dated 24th October 2000 the Respondent (in the person of one Linda Grealy, Deciding Officer) the Applicant was informed that:-
	(a)  The original decision that the application was manifestly unfounded per        Joseph Keaney 
	(b) The fact of the appeal and the recommendation of the refusal dated 6th October 2000.  
	     Both (a) and (b) aforesaid recite as the reason for refusal paragraph 14 (b) of the Hope Hanlon procedures.  
	(c) The Minister’s decision on consideration of the recommendation of the Appeals Authority to uphold the original decision and refuse the appeal.
	(d) The fact that “as a result of this refusal” for the reason of the failure to meet the requirements of paragraph of 14(b) (of the Hope Hanlon procedures) the Minister proposed to make a deportation order.  

	Neither the decision at first instance or on appeal was challenged  under Order 84 of the Rules of the Superior Courts, within the terms of that order.   The Applicant elected at a time when he had the benefit of legal advice to apply to the Respondent  pursuant to the provisions of Section 3 of the Illegal Immigrants Act 1999 for leave to remain on in the State on humanitarian grounds.  This was done by letter of 9th November 2000, which (inter alia) stated:-
	“This application on behalf of the above named is being made without prejudice to the fact that in breach of Section 3(3) of the Immigration Act 1999 the Minister in notifying his proposal to make a deportation order by letter dated 24th October 2000 failed to set out the reasons for this proposal.  It was submitted that the Minister in order to comply with the provisions of Section 3(3) Immigration Act 1999 and to afford fair procedures must immediately furnish the reasons and afford the above named an opportunity to reply to and comment on same. Please furnish the Minister’s reasons for his proposal to make a deportation order.”

	In the events which have happened the Respondent signed the deportation order dated 1st March 2001 and Notice thereof with the reasons therefor were set out in a letter dated 12 March 2001.   Proceedings by way of Judicial Review were lodged in the Central Office on 28th March 2001 and the proceedings awaited the outcome of the P.L. and B. case determined by the Supreme Court on 30th July 2001.  On the matter coming on for hearing it was conceded that it could only proceed on grounds 5, 6, and 9 of the original application.  However, a further notice of motion dated 26th November 2001 sought leave (subject in securing an extension of time from the Court) to advance a number of additional reliefs.  As in all other cases where an extension of time is involved I permitted the Applicant to present his case in full as if it were the actual application for Judicial Review so that he would have the most ample opportunity to advance whatever merits his case may have had to show good an sufficient reason for extending the time period.  The decision of the Supreme Court in G.K. and Others .v. The Minister  for Justice Equality and Law Reform  (unreported 17th December 2001) subsequent to the hearing of this case and before the delivery of this Judgment - permits of a consideration of the merits.  In the instant case I declined to extend the time for additional reliefs as no good and sufficient reason had been advanced sufficient to overcome the time restriction under Section 5 (2)(a) of the Illegal Immigrants (Trafficking) Act, 2000 in particular I find as a fact and as a matter of law that 
(a)	The  dating of the documents at first instance is fully and satisfactorily explained in the Affidavit of Joseph Keaney.  
(b)	The Applicant elected to proceed to appeal on reliance of the refusal at first instance at which time and at all subsequent times he had the benefit of legal advice. 
(c)	Both at the time of formulation of the appeal and the presentation of the Section 3 application ‘for leave to remain on humanitarian grounds’ the possibility of Judicial Review was adverted to but not pursued at the time.
(d)	The Minister’s reason at first instance and on appeal was clearly set out as the failure of the Applicant to meet the requirements of Article 14(b) of the Hope Hanlon procedure, and it was for this reason that he proposed making a deportation order (as required by Section 3(3)(a)) of the Act of 1999.  
(e)	There was no failure at first instance on appeal or thereafter by the Respondent in observing the minimum requirements of natural and constitutional justice.
(f)	Concerning ground 5 which the Applicant sought to rely I am satisfied that the Applicant’s application was made under the Hope Hanlon procedure and this procedure was subsequently put on a statutory footing.  The Minister need not reconsider an entire application under the Hope Hanlon procedure where the procedure has been superceded by a statutory scheme.  The Minister need not reconsider an application from the beginning where there has been a change in the system: (Dascalu  .v. the Minister & Anor, O’Sullivan J. unreported 4th November 1999).  The Applicants in the P.L. and B. case each arrived in Ireland whilst the Hope Hanlon procedure was in operation but deportation orders issued under the statutory scheme.  The manifestly unfounded procedure existed under the Hope Hanlon procedure and therefore there is no significant distinction in the manner in which the application was considered.  I am satisfied from consideration of all the documents and consideration of the submissions made  that the requirements of paragraph 10 of the Hope Hanlon procedures were observed. 

(g)	Grounds 6 & 9
	These grounds relate significantly to matters which have already been decided in the P.L. and B. case.  The Applicant’s submission was that the Respondent is relying on the maintenance of the integrity of the asylum immigration system as a ground for refusing leave to the Applicant to remain in the State, when the system was manifestly inadequate.  I am not satisfied that the system was manifestly inadequate.  And furthermore it is a matter within the remit of the Respondent to insure that the integrity of the asylum process and that the system is observed.  Otherwise it would be most invidious if it could be carried out in an arbitrary fashion.  It is further submitted that the Respondent failed to inform him of the reasons for which the Respondent proposed  to make a deportation order.  I reject this submission as it is quite clear from my reading of the documents and from what has already appeared in this judgment that the reason why the application was considered manifestly unfounded was because of the failure of the Applicant to supply sufficient details or evidence within the terms of paragraph 14(b) of the Hope Hanlon  procedures.  It would be invidious of me to lay down what the criteria should be, but each case must have within it a sufficiency of information to enable the decision maker to come to a view to make a decision. Only in such circumstances as the evidence and the details of information are sufficiently adequate to enable that decision to be arrived at in that fashion can decisions be made.  The considerations of common good and public policy are clearly matters within the remit of the Minister as set out in Section 3(6) of the Immigration Act 1999  the Minister is obligated to consider such matters.  The letter of the 12th March 2001 giving the Applicant notice of the making of the deportation order is impugned by the Applicant on the basis that there is a failure in some regard on the Respondent to give reasons.  The reasons set out in the letter were those found by the Supreme Court to be sufficient and adequate within the terms of the P.L. and B. case and are as follows:-
	“The reasons for the Minister’s decision are that you are a person whose refugee status has been refused and, having regard to the facts set out in Section 3(6) of the Immigration Act, 1999 including representations received on your behalf, the Minister is satisfied that the interest of public policy and the common good in maintaining the integrity of the asylum and immigration systems outweigh such features of your case as might tend to support your being granted leave to remain in this State.” 

	This in my judgment meets the requirements of Section 3(3)(b)(ii) of the Immigration Act of 1999.  The application for leave was treated as the application for judicial review and I am satisfied that the application should be dismissed.