THE HIGH COURT
			JUDICIAL REVIEW				2000 No. 165JR
BETWEEN 
ELIZABETH KAVANAGH
			APPLICANT
AND
THE LEGAL AID BOARD, THE MINISTER FOR JUSTICE EQUALITY AND LAW REFORM,  THE MINISTER FOR FINANCE, IRELAND AND THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
			RESPONDENTS
Judgment of Mr. Justice Paul Butler delivered the  24th day of October, 2001.
1.	Background 
The first named Respondent (hereinafter referred to as “the Board”) is established under Section 3 of the Civil Legal Aid Act, 1995.  The principal function of the Board is described in Section 5 (1) of the Act as being ....
“To provide, within the Board's resources and subject to the other provisions of this Act, legal aid and advice in Civil Cases to persons who satisfy the requirements of this Act”.
On the 23rd September 1997 the Applicant applied to the Board for legal aid in connection with an application for Judicial Separation.  By letter of the same date the Board indicated that, on account of the demand for legal services in the Tallaght Law Centre, it was not in a position even to process her application at that time.  It was not until almost twenty months later, in May, 1999 that her application was processed and granted.  
In the meantime, in October 1997 the Applicant completed an application for legal services in connection with another matter and was given an appointment with a Solicitor under the Board’s Private Practitioners Scheme.  The same was operated by the Board in respect of certain proceedings in the District Court whereby legal services were provided through private Solicitors who were not employees of the Board.  In April, 1998 a further similar application was made.  Both applications were granted.  
While awaiting the outcome of her application for legal aid in relation to the Judicial Separation Proceedings the Applicant was forced to leave the family home because of a violent incident.  While this appears to be factually correct I do not see any connection between the Applicant being forced to leave her home and the delay in the Judicial Separation Proceedings as legal aid was available to her under the Private Practitioner Scheme hereinbefore referred to. 
It seems that, as a matter of fact, what was suffered by the Applicant by the delay in the processing of her application for legal aid in connection with the Judicial Separation Proceedings was the ordinary inconvenience caused by any such delay, namely not having such an important matter dealt with promptly and not having her affairs settled. 
Judicial Separation Proceedings were duly instituted on behalf of the Applicant and she was granted a Barring Order therein.  The second period of delay complained to relates to the period between July, 1999 and April, 2000.  The Applicant complains that she received only one communication from the Board during that period.  The proceedings in this case were instituted on the 7th April, 2000 and the Applicant’s Judicial Separation Proceedings have since been brought to a conclusion. 
2.	The Relief Claimed.
In these proceedings the Applicant seeks various declarations to the effect that the Respondent was obliged to consider her Application for legal aid within a reasonable time, to the effect that the representation to which she was entitled should include all such assistance as is usually given by a Solicitor or Barrister in connection with proceedings for Judicial Separation, that she enjoyed the same rights and privileges arising from her relationship with the Solicitor provided to her by the Board as she would have enjoyed had she been in a position to engage the services of a Solicitor in private practice, that the Board was obliged to prosecute her proceedings with reasonable expedition and that it was obliged to answer her reasonable request for information in relation thereto and that the Board has failed to prosecute her proceedings for Judicial Separation with a reasonable expedition and has failed to answer such reasonable requests.
The Applicant further seeks an Order for Mandamus directing the Board to prosecute the Applicant’s proceedings for Judicial Separation with reasonable expedition and to answer her reasonable request for information in relation to the same and an Order for Mandamus directing the second and third named Respondents to provide to the Board sufficient resources to enable it to comply with the obligations above referred to.
3.	Mootness 
It is argued on behalf of the Respondents that the proceedings are now moot.  In particular, it has been submitted that the Applicant cannot obtain the Orders for Mandamus referred to as the proceedings for Legal Separation have now been concluded.  I agree and it is no longer contended on behalf of the Applicant that there should be an Order or Orders of Mandamus.  
I am satisfied that, apart from the possible question of damages, whether or not any or all of the Orders sought in these proceedings are made will not effect the Applicant and, to that extent, the proceedings are moot.  
The claim for damages, however, remains and by reason thereof, I must proceed to consider what I understand to be the substantive issue in this case.
4.	Statutory Duty
The grounds upon which relief is sought in these proceedings are entirely based upon an alleged breach of statutory duty.  No question arises as to any rights to which the Applicant may be entitled by virtue of the Constitution or by any international convention.  The claim is solely based upon rights and duties arising from the Legal Aid Act, 1995.
Section 5 (1) of the Act provides that:-
“The principal function of the Board shall be to provide, within the Board’s resources and subject to the other provisions of this Act, legal aid and advice in Civil Cases to persons who satisfy the requirements of this Act.”  
The substantive issue in this case centres on the interpretation of the said words ...
        “ within the Board’s resources”.
The Board makes the case that “resources” means not just financial resources but other resources such as the availability of personnel.  The uncontroverted evidence is that the Board's said resources were limited and stretched most particularly at times material to these proceedings by reason of a number of factors including the introduction of Divorce in our jurisdiction. 
It is argued on behalf of the Applicant that legal aid has the meaning ascribed to it by Section 27 of the Act and that once the Applicant is entitled to legal aid she is entitled thereto without the qualification and, in particular, without the qualification of the same being within the resources of the Applicant.
I am satisfied that the language of Section 5 (1) quoted above is plain and obvious and requires no special interpretation.  The Board shall provide, within its resources and subject to other provisions of the Act legal aid to persons who satisfy the requirements of the Act.  The words simply mean that legal aid shall be provided within the Board's resources and I am fully satisfied on the basis of the Affidavits (and it seems to me that there is no controversy on this aspect of the matter) that that is precisely what the Board did in this case.  The Board had a method of dealing with cases in a certain order of priority and within that scheme the Applicant was given equal treatment to all other Applicants.
5.	By reason of all of the foregoing I refuse the relief sought.