CO/1066/2000
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE
QUEEN’S BENCH DIVISION
CROWN OFFICE LIST
Royal Courts of Justice
Strand
London WC2A 2LL

Tuesday 5 December 2000
B e f o r e
Mr JACK BEATSON Q.C.

Sitting as a Deputy High Court Judge
THE QUEEN
v
MAYOR AND BURGESSES OF THE LONDON BOROUGH
OF BARKING AND DAGENHAM
EX PARTE
(1) MAKILA EBUKI
(2) BRANDON EBUKI (BY HIS MOTHER AND
LITIGATION FRIEND MAKILA EBUKI)
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(Transcript of the Handed Down Judgment of
Smith Bernal Reporting Limited, 190 Fleet Street
London EC4A 2AG
Tel No: 020 7421 4040,  Fax No:  020 7831 8838
Official Shorthand Writers to the Court)
-	- - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
-	Ms N Ulasi (instructed by Ulasi & Partners, Corbett Grove, N22 8DQ) appeared on behalf of the Claimant
-	Mr M Cumming (instructed by Edell Jones & Lessers DX4701 East Ham) appeared on bahalf of the Defendant
Judgment
As Approved by the Court

Crown Copyright ©

JACK. BEATSON Q.C.:-

1.	These judicial review proceedings are concerned with section 17 of the Children Act 1989 which imposes a general duty on local authorities to safeguard and promote the welfare of children by providing services for children in need. Section 17 provides:
(1)	It shall be the general duty of every local authority (in addition to the other duties imposed on them by this Part)-
(a)	to safeguard and promote the elfare of children within their area who are in need; and
(b)	so far as is consistent with that duty, to promote the upbringing of such children by their families,
by providing a range and level of serives appropriate to those children's needs.
…
(6) The services provided by a local authority in the exercise of functions conferred on them by this section may include giving assistance in kind or, in exceptional circumstances, in cash.

…
(10) For the purposes of this Part a child shall be taken to be in need if - 
(a)	he is unlikely to achieve or maintain, or to have the opportunity of achieving or maintaining a reasonable standard of health or development without the provision for him of services by a local authority under this Part;
(b)	his health or development is likely to be significantly impaired, or further impaired, without the provision for him of such services; or
(c)	he is disabled,
and "family", in relation to such a child, includes any person who has parental responsibility for the child and any other person with whom he has been living. 

2.	It is common ground that, as Mr Justice Kay stated in R v Tower Hamlets LBC, ex p Bradford (1997) 29 HLR 756, 764, the proper exercise of the duty under section 17 "requires a two step approach, an assessment of need followed by a service provision decision". 

3.	The Applicants, Makila Ebuki and her three year old son Brandon, challenge the decision of the London Borough of Barking and Dagenham on 21 March 2000 to evict them from their accommodation at 108 Boundary Road Essex, a homeless persons' hostel  on the morning of 22 March 2000 and to make no further provision for their accommodation.  In form 86A they sought certiorari to quash the decision of 21 March 2000; an order of mandamus to assess Brandon as a child in need under section 17 of the Children Act 1989, and to provide him with suitable accommodation; and an interim injunction requiring the local authority to provide suitable  accommodation for the Applicants. 

4.	On 27 March 2000 the matter came before Mr Justice Kay and, having heard argument on behalf of the applicant and the respondent,  his Lordship granted permission to apply for judicial review and ordered that the local authority continue to provide the Applicants with accommodation for 14 days or until further order. As will be seen, things have moved on since then. The Respondent accept that Brandon is a child in need of accommodation.

5.	I deal with two preliminary matters before turning to the substance of the challenge. They both arise out of developments since the grant of permission. The first is that when the case came before Mr Justice Scott Baker on 9 October, his Lordship ordered that the application be adjourned for 28 days, that the Applicant have leave to amend form 86A and that the Respondents be allowed to enter as evidence a witness statement  of Ian Leadbetter, the Manager of the Initial Assessment Service of the Children and Family Division at the relevant time. His Lordship also ordered that the Applicant, with the assistance of her solicitors, look for accommodation in the private sector and make an application for housing benefit, the Respondent undertaking to use its best endeavours to process any application for housing benefit with expedition, and the Applicant undertaking that she continued to reside at the address mentioned in the injunction. 

6.	At that stage the evidence in support of the Applicant's case consisted of a witness statement of Ngosi Ulasi, the Applicant's solicitor, signed on 22 March 2000, an affidavit by Miss Ulasi sworn on 23 March 2000, and affidavit sworn by the applicant Makila Ebuke on 17 April 2000 and a statement by Miss Ebuke signed on 12 September 2000. At the outset of the hearing before me Miss Miskin, on behalf of the Applicant, sought permission for two further statements and an affidavit to be entered as evidence. These responded to Mr Leadbetter's statement and provided evidence as to the Applicant's endeavours to find accommodation in the private sector in the light of Mr Justice Scott Baker's Order. Miss Ulasi swore an Affidavit on 17 November dealing with the advice and guidance given to the Applicant in her endeavours to find accommodation in the private sector. Miss Ebuke swore an affidavit on 23 November responding to Mr Leadbetter's statement and there is also a statement by her dealing with dealing with her endeavours to find accommodation. This statement is undated but it appears to have reached the Administrative Court Office on 20 November. 

7.	Mr Sahonte, on behalf of the Respondent, did not oppose the admission of this evidence but stated that Miss Ebuki's statements had only been received on Thursday 23 or Friday 24th November. He had not been able to obtain instructions from the Respondent and was not in a position to challenge what was stated in them. There had been no notice that there would be an application to adduce further evidence although there is a reference to further evidence in a letter from the Applicants' solicitors dated 6 November. There was also no explanation of why the statements were served at this late date. The correspondence exhibited to Ms Ulasi's affidavit is dated 26 October 2000 and Miss Ebuki's statement deals with visits to landlords and estate agents between 14 and 24 October, and to the Respondent's Social Services Department and Homeless Persons Unit on 27 October 2000. Notwithstanding the lateness of these statements, I allowed them to be entered as evidence. In view of Mr Justice Scott Baker's orders it was important to have evidence as to what Miss Ebuki had done to look for accommodation in the private sector and regarding an application for housing benefit.

8.	The second preliminary matter arose in the following way. As noted above the relief originally sought included an order of Mandamus requiring the respondent to assess Brandon as a child in need under section 17, and to provide him with suitable accommodation.  Mr Leadbetter's statement and the documents exhibited to it showed that a section 17 assessment had in fact taken place on 28 June 2000. The Applicants considered that it was not a proper assessment. Miss Miskin sought the inclusion of a new paragraph 3 seeking "an Order of Mandamus, having carried out the assessment and identified the child as a child in need of suitable accommodation, to provide him with the same". Mr Sahonte opposed this. He submitted that permission had been given by Kay J on the basis that no section 17 assessment had been carried prior to the decision of the Respondent on 21 March 2000 to evict the Applicants from the hostel, whereas the new relief sought was in effect a challenge to a different decision, the decision as to the service provision made by the Respondent when they subsequently made a section 17 assessment. 

9.	Miss Miskin submitted that this amendment would not mean that the application had changed its character since the grant of permission. Until the hearing in October before Mr Justice Scott Baker the applicants believed that no assessment had been made but the issue remained as it had been at the time Kay J gave permission, one of the suitability of the accommodation; the need and, if there was one, how to meet it. If, as the Applicants had always submitted there was a need to be fulfilled, then the assessment would have to include a determination as to how to meet it; the second stage of the exercise of the duty under section 17. I allowed the amendment Miss Miskin sought. Although it reflects developments made since the grant of leave, I do not consider that it changes the nature of the application (see Mr Justice Kay in R v Tower Hamlets LBC, ex p Bradford (1997) 29 HLR 756, 764). The issue was and remains the legality of the Respondent's decision as to how to meet Brandon's accommodation needs. There is a substantial overlap with the order of Mandamus originally sought. In these circumstances, it is neither necessary nor appropriate to require any challenge to what the authority did following the grant of permission to be the subject of new proceedings. Following the grant of permission, several assessments were made by the Respondent's Social Services Department purportedly under section 17. Mr Sahonte's submission would in effect have meant that any of these, however flawed, would have brought the present proceedings to a halt and required a fresh application for permission and the attendant delay and expense..

10.	The Facts:  In view of the way the matter has developed it is necessary to set out the facts in some detail. Until June 1999 the applicants lived in local authority accommodation but there were arrears of rent because Miss Ebuki was not in receipt of Housing Benefit. On 23 February 1999 the Respondent obtained a possession order and in June 1999 she was evicted. Since then she has been living in the hostel  in Boundary Road. On 21 March 2000 she was told by the hostel manager that she would have to leave it the next day. That day an injunction was granted by Smith J ordering the Respondent to continue to provide temporary accommodation for the Applicants, and it was renewed on 23 March until the hearing of application for permission to move for judicial review.

11.	Following the grant of permission by Kay J, on 12 April, Miss Ebuki  attended the Respondent's offices for an assessment. Although a letter dated 6 April from the Homeless Persons Unit invited Miss Ebuki  to attend the Social Services Department for an assessment under section 17 (Mr Leadbetter para 5 and  Exhibit p25), and see internal memo dated 5 April (page 24 of the exhibit to Mr Leadbetter's statement), it is not clear that the officer conducting the assessment realised that what was required was an assessment under section 17 since the form filled in (page 16 of the exhibit to Mr Leadbetter's statement) stated that the purpose was to assess whether the family might need social workers intervention and the assessed need box ticked was "advice". The assessment was that Brandon was not in need of accommodation at that stage.(Mr Leadbetter para 5) 

12.	Miss Ebuki's first affidavit, sworn on 17 April stated that no detailed questions had been asked on 12 April to determine the circumstances of the Applicants or to assess Brandon's need for accommodation. Following the receipt of this affidavit officials from the social services department visited the hostel on 27 April. A letter dated 27 April from  Janet Lamb, a project manager in the social services department to Mr Cummings of Edell Jones and Lessers, the Respondent's solicitors, states that the purpose of the visit was to explain the Council's duties under section 17. Mr Leadbetter's evidence is that the visit was to carry out a section 17 assessment. He states that on the previous day – a contact sheet file note (page 27 of the exhibit to Mr Leadbetter's statement) states night - they had asked the hostel warden to put a note under her door but Miss Ebuki was not present and the note was still on the floor. Miss Ebuki attended the office later that day but was not seen because she had not made an appointment. Mr Leadbetter states that "as the Applicant [Miss Ebuki] was not staying at the hostel, it was assessed that assistance would not be required by Brandon as the Applicant was not in receipt of accommodation and clearly had accommodation elsewhere." Ms Lamb's letter to Mr Cummings puts the matter differently. She stated that "[t]here are no plans to further assess Miss Ebuki or her son, as there do[es] not appear to be a need for service under section 17, Miss Ebuki's need does seem to be a housing issue and nothing else". [Bundle p 19]

13.	On the 19 May the Respondents solicitors wrote [to the Applicants solicitors] stating that there was no need for services under section 17 and enclosing the letter from Mrs Lamb to Mr Cummings. On 23 May the Applicants solicitors wrote setting out the Applicants position in detail. They stated inter alia that it appeared that the needs of Brandon had not been central to the assessment, and that the suitability of the accommodation at the hostel had apparently not been examined. It identified the problem as a housing problem but did nothing to address it. On12 June the applicants solicitors wrote stating they were still awaiting a definitive response to the question as to whether the Respondent considered that Miss Ebuki and Brandon were in need of suitable permanent housing accommodation. They reminded the Respondent of their comments on the section 17 report; i.e. that it was deficient in failing to address the issue of the needs of Brandon for secure accommodation which would provide him with a proper environment.

14.	Eventually, a further section 17 assessment was commenced on 22 June (Mr Leadbetter para 10) and completed on 28 June. The material part of the assessment under heading "i" "Needs" states:- 

"[F]amily needs accommodation desperately for the growth and development of child. They also request a permanent address for Brandon's enrolment in school.
The family has been assessed and the child is not in need."

It is recommended that the Housing Department should seek to provide accommodation for this family because the reason for her eviction was because of arrears which was [sic] accured due to her Housing Benefit Forms not being processed and in order to prevent any long term detrimental effects that are very likely to occur if the situation persists e.g. mother finding this particularly stressful which indirectly affects the child."

I note that, although the use of "not" in the third sentence was said by Miss Miskin to make the assessment itself perverse in view of the tenor of the rest of the assessment, I accept Mr Sahonte's submission that it is simply an error and that what the authority did following the assessment showed that it regarded Brandon as in need of accommodation. Nevertheless, the error shows a measure of confusion in making a decision in what Mr Sahonte described as a situation of acute crisis.

15.	In an earlier part of the assessment it is stated that "it appears her [i.e. Miss Ebuki] needs is accommodation".  The decision was thus that Brandon was in need of accommodation. Mr Leadbetter's evidence is (para 11) that he then sought advice as to whether monetary assistance could be provided "insofar as a deposit would be made available. The deposit would be non-returnable and the Applicant would be able to find accommodation in the private sector."

16.	On 11 July (Bundle p 26) the Respondent's solicitors wrote to the Applicants' solicitors informing them that the Respondents proposed to undertake a financial assessment of Miss Ebuki with a view to her finding accommodation in the private sector. The letter stated that "Our clients are prepared to meet any shortfall as between what your client can pay towards the rent and the rental figure". The financial assessment occurred at a meeting at the hostel on 19 July. As well as the Respondent's officer ascertaining that the applicant was in receipt of income support and child support but had no other money, the applicant was asked to confirm whether she could stay with relations or pool the resources of herself and her sister. Mr Leadbetter states (para 11) he had taken advice as to whether monetary assistance could be provided by way of a deposit and the purpose of the visit was "to advise the applicant of the outcome of  the section 17 assessment and detail to her the assistance that would have been given and this is what we did". The file note of the meeting (page 37 of the exhibit to Mr Leadbetter's statement), however, states that the social worker explained the purpose of the visit was "to specifically look into her financial condition, and the possibility of renting a simple flat within her capability". The social worker's comments on this that "[t]he whole interview did not produce any positive result." The recommendation was that Miss Ebuki and her sister "be brought together to help each other with their housing problems". (pages 37-38 of the exhibit to Mr Leadbetter's statement) 

17.	On 27 July (Bundle p 28) the Respondent wrote asking the applicant to make enquiries of local estate agents for appropriate accommodation and to furnish the addresses and list of costings. Mr Leadbetter states (para 12) the Applicant was asked to produce costings and on the approval of the costings a deposit "would have been paid". The letter of 27 July, however, makes no reference to the provision of a deposit. 

18.	The Applicants' solicitors replied to the letter of 11 July in a letter dated 2 August. This letter states that although the proposal was a positive step, it was circular since the Respondent would essentially be assessing Miss Ebuki with a view to awarding Housing Benefit. Miss Ebuki had been seeking a proper determination of her previous application for Housing Benefit and to be restored into possession of the premises from which she had been evicted. The solicitors asked for a copy of the section 17 report. The report was not sent and Mr Leadbetter states (para 14) that it was never requested.

19.	On 7 August Miss Ebuki informed the respondent that she could not find agencies that accepted DSS payments and was told to do some more searching. A note on the Respondent's files (page 41 of the exhibit to Mr Leadbetter's statement)  dated 8 August stated "while we might be able to assist the family in obtaining accommodation by paying the initial months rent and deposit, the family would need to ensure that it could meet future payments either by themselves or through housing benefit. We cannot assist long term." 

20.	On 18 August the Applicants' solicitors wrote to the Respondent's solicitors stating that the Respondent was ignoring Miss Ebuki's grave financial hardship and the current assessment, while giving the impression of providing assistance to her, would be ineffective since what she needed was the provision of housing. The notice of the hearing on 9 October had been sent on 17 August and on 22 August the Respondent's solicitors wrote (Bundle p 38) inviting the Applicants' solicitors to discontinue the judicial review since a section 17 assessment had been undertaken, suitable temporary accommodation provided and the Applicant advised that the Respondent would be prepared "to provide assistance with regards to a payment of money in relation to accommodation in the private sector". The Applicants' solicitors responded stating that they did not accept that the Respondent had reviewed their client's position properly or in all the circumstances acted reasonably in accordance with Wednesbury principles. A note on the Respondent's files (page 41 of the exhibit to Mr Leadbetter's statement)  dated 29 August  refers to a telephone conversation  with Miss Ebuki in which she said she was not looking for property because no one took DSS clients and was told that was not the case as others in a similar position to her had in fact been re-housed.

21.	The next development was the hearing before Scott Baker J, in which Miss Ebuki was ordered to look for accommodation in the private sector and make an application for housing benefit, and the Respondent undertook to use its best endeavours to process any application for housing benefit with expedition. 

22.	Miss Ebuki's evidence in her recent statements is that she visited six letting agencies between 14 – 24 October, that those who had suitable flats required a deposit of one months rent and one months rent in advance, which she did not have. Additionally she states that many of the agencies she approached operated a policy of not letting accommodation to persons who are on income support. Ms Ulasi's affidavit states that she in the light of what Miss Ebuki had said she wrote to three estate agents to enquire as to available accommodation. Only one reply was received, from Longbridge Estates, which stated that it did not have any property which could be let to persons on income support. In a fax dated 26 October they state that they are unable to accept any housing benefit applicants due to the twenty plus week processing delay at Barking and Dagenham Council. All their landlords have instructed them to only let to private tenants.

23.	Miss Ebuki's also states that she visited the Respondent's Homeless Persons Unit on 27 October. Her evidence is that the person she spoke to, a Mr Kyle, had told her that her Housing Department file had been closed and she was to find accommodation in the private sector. As noted, Mr Sahonte informed me that in view of the timing of these statements he had not been able to take instructions on what was said. He invited me to treat Miss Ebuki's evidence with caution. There is, however, a reference to a visit on 27 October and to contact with Mr Kyle in a letter dated 6 November from her solicitors to the Respondent's solicitors, although what Mr Kyle said to her is not in the letter.

24.	Submissions: It is accepted by Miss Miskin that a decision by the Respondent to give financial assistance in finding private accommodation to meet Brandon's section 17 need for accommodation would be a valid exercise of its broad discretion under section 17 if it is possible to find such accommodation locally. But she submitted that where an offer of assistance is made to the family of a child in need that is known to be inadequate to provide the service needed - here accommodation - such an offer is perverse and unreasonable in the Wednesbury sense. In the present case the Respondent offered to provide financial assistance in finding accommodation but not to assist with the rent although they know Miss Ebuki is on social security, does not receive housing benefit, and cannot afford such accommodation. Miss Miskin submitted that this offer reflects a service provision decision which cannot be effective and is therefore perverse and unreasonable in the Wednesbury sense.

25.	Mr Sahonte, on behalf of the authority, relied on the letters of 11 July and 22 August, and the lack of reply by the Applicants to the letter of 27 July. He submitted that there was nothing in the documents to indicate the Applicants considered finance was a problem in obtaining private accommodation. He stated that Miss Ebuki's view that the need for a deposit and a month's rent in advance should have been put to the Respondent. There was nothing to suggest that the Respondent would not assist. As to the ineffectiveness of the service provision, he submitted that it was not ineffective, that matters had not advanced because the Applicants had provided no costings, not because the Respondent had made a derisory offer. The Respondent had at all times kept an open mind. Mr Sahonte also submitted that the lateness of the most recent evidence on behalf of the Applicants which raised the issue meant that, even if I find that the service provision decision is reviewable,  in the exercise of my discretion I should decline to grant the Applicants  the relief sought.

26.	Findings: It is clear that the Respondent was very suspicious of Miss Ebuki. Borough officers considered she was in fact living elsewhere and not at the hostel. She has denied this and it is neither necessary nor indeed possible for this dispute to be resolved in these judicial review proceedings. It is possible that the Housing Department was also affected by its previous experience with her. They may have approached  the section 17 assessment and in particular the question of service provision under section 17 with this in mind. It is also clear that Miss Ebuki and her solicitors did not respond to the Respondent's requests in July and continued to press for her to be accommodated in public housing. But the financial difficulties were brought to the Respondent's attention, for example in solicitors' letters dated  2 and 18 August and 6 November. In that dated 6 November it is said that it appeared unlikely that Miss Ebuki would find accommodation due to her "impoversished/financial circumstances". 

27.	The Respondent decided on 28 June that Brandon was in need of accommodation and assessed Miss Ebuki's financial position on 19 July. But there was no clarity as to what the Respondent was proposing to offer the Applicants in terms of service provision. Nothing definite appears to have been said on 19 July. The letter of 11 July, which referred to the Respondent meeting "any shortfall" (emphasis added) as between what Miss Ebuki can pay towards the rent and the rental figure, was not followed up save by that of 27 July requesting that she obtain costings and it appears that the Respondent later decided to offer much less. Mr Leadbetter states (para 12) that on the approval of the costings a deposit would have been paid. The applicants and her solicitors do not, however, appear to have been told of this. They complained about the impossibility of finding private accommodation because she could not afford the deposit. This does not suggest that they were aware that the Respondent was willing to pay the deposit.  In any event what was required was both a deposit and one months rent in advance. As late as 8 August the Respondent's internal note states that the social services department "might" be able to assist the family in obtaining accommodation by paying the initial months rent and deposit, but makes it clear that it could not provide long term assistance. 

28.	The evidence before me is that what was needed was a deposit equivalent to one month's rent and payment of one month's rent in advance. The most recent statement on behalf of the Respondent, in Mr Leadbetter's witness statement is that only a deposit would be offered. There is thus a mismatch between what the Respondent had most recently decided to provide as reflected in Mr Leadbetter's statement and what estate agents required. There is also evidence that some agencies would not let to persons in receipt of income support, apparently because of the Respondent's delays in processing  applications for Housing Benefits. I do not, however,  conclude that it was not possible for those in receipt of income support to rent property from private landlords in the area. First, there is evidence in Mr Leadbetter's statement that others had done so and been re-housed. It is not possible for this Court to resolve such conflicts in the statements and affidavits. Secondly, the Respondent has been unable to take instructions on this late evidence.

29.	There is finally what the applicants' solicitors have referred to as the circularity point. Miss Ebuki was not someone who could approach private landlords with confidence. In addition to the initial financial assistance, in order to secure private accommodation, Ms Ebuki would have to show either that she could afford to pay rent or that she would be in receipt of Housing Benefit. It is clear that she cannot afford to pay rent. She was neither in receipt of Housing Benefit nor had she been told by the Respondent after the financial assessment in July that she would get Housing Benefit or even that she would be given assistance in applying for it. In any  event, until she had found accommodation she could not apply for Housing Benefit. It was, moreover, the case that by 8 August the Respondent had decided that no assistance would be given with rent or apparently with Housing Benefit. The file note states that it was "for the family" to ensure that it could meet future payments either by themselves or through housing benefit. It was only at the hearing on 9 October that there was a positive indication from the Respondent and then it was that the Respondent would assist with an application for Housing Benefit by seeking to have it processed with expedition. The history of the relations between the parties suggests that this was not a straightforward issue and until 9 October there had been no indication that following the section 17 assessment anything had changed with regard to housing benefit. Also it is Miss Ebuki's evidence that, contrary to what had been said at the hearing before Scott Baker J., when she visited the Homeless Persons Unit on 27 October she was told by Mr Kyle that her file was closed.  Although I bear in mind Mr Sahonte's submission to treat Miss Ebuki's evidence with caution, the letter dated 6 November from her solicitors to the Respondent's solicitors does refer to a visit to the Homeless Persons Unit on 27 October and to dealings with Mr Kyle. 

30.	In the absence of an offer (a) to pay the one month's rent as well as the deposit, and (b) to assist in respect of further rent payments pending the determination of an application for Housing Benefit, and without the Respondent assisting Miss Ebuki to secure Housing Benefit expeditiously I conclude that the Respondent's offer to assist her and Brandon in finding private accommodation was an ineffective offer. In these circumstances, and given the background of this case, I conclude that insofar as there was a determination with regard to service provision under section 17 made by the Respondent, it was not one which enabled Miss Ebuki to meet the costs of renting a flat and was not made in a way which would give letting agencies the confidence that she would be able to meet those costs. 

31.	I have considered whether the Applicants should be denied relief because of their non-reponsiveness to the Respondent's letter of 27 July and the lateness of their evidence as to Miss Ebuki's efforts to find accommodation. I have concluded that they should not. Although the Applicants' conduct may in these respects be open to question, there are unsatisfactory aspects of the Respondent's conduct even taking account of the fact that the relevant part of the social services department, with a staff of three, was dealing with over 400 references a week. I have commented on the lack of clarity in the Respondent's decision as to service provision once they had identified Brandon's need for accommodation. Moreover, it does not appear either from the relevant file notes or subsequent correspondence that the decision was communicated to the Applicants after the financial assessment had been undertaken save in the most general of terms: for example on 22 August that the Respondent "would be prepared to provide assistance with regards to a payment of money in relation to accommodation in the private sector". Notwithstanding a request by the Applicants' solicitors, a copy of the assessment was never provided to them. 

32.	Accordingly, certiorari will issue to quash the decision of 21 March, which was made well before any section 17 assessment. In the circumstances I also consider that the Respondent, having carried out an assessment under section 17 and identified Brandon as a child in need of suitable accommodation, should determine how to meet this need in accordance with law. 

33.	In view, however, of the uncertainties which remain even after the hearing, I am not prepared to make an order of Mandamus in the form sought by Miss Miskin. Miss Miskin accepted that a decision by the Respondent to give financial assistance in finding private accommodation to meet Brandon's section 17 need for accommodation rather than to provide the accommodation itself would be a valid exercise of the Respondent's discretion under section 17 provided that the decision is an effective one in the sense that it is possible to find such accommodation locally. But paragraph 3 of the amended relief sought would require the authority to provide the accommodation. I shall hear counsel as to the form of any further relief which must be upon the basis of findings that I have expressed.