Case No:  NE14C00109 
In the FAMILY COURT
Sitting at NEWCASTLE UPON TYNE

The Quayside
Newcastle upon Tyne 
NE1 3LA

10th December 2014
B E F O R E:

HIS HONOUR JUDGE SIMON WOOD

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Re A&B 
(Children: Care & Placement Orders)

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Counsel for Northumberland CC: Mr T Spain
Counsel for M: Mr N Stonor
F did not appear and his Counsel, Miss B Dawson, was granted leave to withdraw
Paternal grandmother acted in person
Solicitor for the Children: Mr J Flower
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Judgment
His Honour Judge Simon Wood  :  
1.	The court is concerned with the welfare of a boy, A, born 14th March 2010 and so he is now four years, nine months; and his full-sister, B, born on 9th July 2013, and so aged 17 months.

2.	Northumberland County Council, by an initial application issued on 21st February 2013, to which B was subsequently joined, sought a care order and a placement order in respect of each child and presented before the court a care plan of permanence outside the family by way of adoption, a very specific and controversial adoption, in that A and B’s foster carers have already been approved as adopters and matched with them and, in those circumstances, the local authority would seek to support them as the children’s adopters in the event that their plan is approved.

3.	The local authority care plans are opposed by A and B’s parents and by PGM, albeit the local authority is supported by the Children’s Guardian, Mrs Sylvia Aitcheson.  The alternative family plan advanced is that the children should be cared for by PGM, under the terms of a special guardianship order and, insofar as is necessary, a supervision order.  The issues are narrow and the alternatives can briefly be stated, but they give rise to very considerable difficulties of determination.  The antiquity of these proceedings is perhaps the first hint of that difficulty and I mention at the outset that the hearing I conducted between 10th and 14th November 2014, and then continued between 1st and 3rd December, was in fact a re-hearing.

4.	After a very late transfer from what was then the Family Proceedings Court to Newcastle upon Tyne County Court, twelve months into the proceedings, District Judge Atherton, on 13th June 2014, by then sitting in the Family Court, made an order rejecting the local authority care plan and inviting it to place the children with PGM.  The local authority not only declined so to do, but, with the support of the Children’s Guardian, appealed that order, which appeal on 11th August came before Her Honour Judge Hudson.  She upheld the appeal and, having concluded in line with recent authority that the circumstances here did not permit her to substitute an alternative conclusion, directed a retrial.

5.	I mention this as an essential part of the history but, as I told all the parties at the hearing, although I have read the judgment allowing the appeal, I have not delved into the decision below any further, because I have been anxious to approach this case with as open a mind as possible, not in any way influenced by earlier judicial thinking.  The rationale, however, for allowing the appeal was the failure of the District Judge to perform an appropriate welfare evaluation.  So it was right of Judge Hudson, as she did, to warn the parties that the result of the appeal in no way indicated the outcome of this rehearing.  Of course, from the grandmother and family’s point of view, the fact of the successful appeal was very disappointing.  It has added considerably to the delay.  This judgment is being given a full six months after the decision had gone in the family’s favour and it has no doubt greatly added to both the stress of the litigation generally, and the burden on the grandmother in particular, at having to manage contact at a distance, as well as juggle her own family life and her job.  Indeed, it is urged on me to take into account, positively, her reaction to this in my assessment and support of the merits of the case which she presents.  I do, of course; but emphasise that neither that fact nor the fact that there was a success before the District Judge can be determinative of this hearing, where the focus has to be on what is best for A and B.

6.	I have talked somewhat in the abstract and need to add some detail.  The parents of both children are M and F.  The status of their relationship has been the subject of controversy.  They are not presently together but the local authority says that there is no confidence that they are in fact separated, certainly not permanently.  M was born in 1989 and is now 25.  F was born in 1984 and will be 30 next week.  They live separately in Northumberland.  Each is a person with an extremely troubled background, including themselves being in care.  The threshold having previously been conceded, neither has sought to advance themselves as carers for their children.

7.	F’s mother is PGM, born in 1965 and so now 49, who lives with her husband who is not F’s father but I will call PGF save where the sense dictates otherwise, and their daughter PA, born in 1994, so 20 years old, each of whom I heard from.  They live in Manchester.  Given the position of the parents, the acute focus has been on PGM, PGF and PA, but it is common ground and clear that the force behind the family plan is PGM, explained in part not just by the lack of any blood tie with her husband, but by the very different personalities that they project.

8.	She was, in many ways, the key witness, but in terms of assessment of her, I heard from Frances Morgan, formerly an agency worker, but a former family court adviser and Children’s Guardian, highly experienced, who prepared a Special Guardianship assessment in August 2013.  That followed a positive screening assessment by the children’s original social worker, Lisa Bell, from whom I did not hear, nor could I, as she has left the employment of the local authority and, remarkably, it has not proved possible to find her.  I heard from Julie Clark, the current social worker, who took over from Lisa Bell in September 2013; I heard from Chris Wood, an independent social worker appointed following the appeal and a successful application for independent social work assessment made to Judge Hudson; and I heard from Sylvia Aitcheson, the Children’s Guardian, not just throughout these proceedings, but also in respect of A in earlier proceedings which had been brought in respect of him.  

9.	By the time the file of professional evidence was complete, the only lone voice was Mr Wood, the independent social worker.  All the local authority professionals and the Guardian support the plan for adoption.  But even Mr Wood had gone from a position in early October of supporting PGM to a position in evidence of being unable to make a recommendation in light of all the evidence he had by then read and considered.  

10.	There was some other evidence but at this stage it is helpful to have the parameters of the hearing in focus.  I should mention that Mr Spain represented the local authority in substitution for counsel at the original hearing; the mother was represented by Mr Stonor, who appeared below, as did Mr Flower, representing the children; the father, who did not attend this hearing at all, was represented by Miss Dawson of counsel.  He had disengaged from the litigation some time ago.  His position was generally that he supported his mother, but he made no effort to involve himself, declined to give instructions or file any evidence since March and did not attend any hearing before me.  On that basis, I gave his counsel leave to withdraw.  

11.	PGM represented herself before me, as she did below, being ineligible for legal aid on means’ grounds, but simultaneously unable to afford legal representation, having spent her savings on travelling repeatedly from Manchester to Northumberland for the purposes of contact and the case generally.  She thereby had a further burden to those already mentioned, burdens with which the court has very considerable sympathy.  I say here and now that she has acquitted herself  admirably in what I know have been difficult circumstances and I want to pay tribute, not just to her, but to the professionalism of all the advocates in affording her what help they could, consistent with the cases they themselves had to present.  

12.	Having indicated the scope of the enquiry, it is nevertheless necessary to detail some of the background because it is directly relevant to welfare considerations.  First, although B is a fit, healthy toddler, despite being denied family care since her discharge from hospital at birth, she has had the advantage of uninterrupted care from the foster carers who have also cared for A.  A is a child with very particular needs.  He was born premature at 27 weeks, spending an extended time in the Special Care Baby Unit.  He is developmentally delayed and has required significant support services, including portage, physiotherapy and speech therapy.  He has significant health issues, with a serious, near fatal, episode of pneumonia, aged just a few months old in late 2010, against a background of chronic lung disease which I understand to be secondary to his very premature birth.  He remains prone to chest conditions, in particular, and illness generally.  Although he has made significant progress in foster care, as at January 2014 his understanding and expression were assessed at being at the level of 18 to 20 months, against a chronological age of 46 months.  He only began walking at 38 months and has obviously persistent motor skill difficulties, both gross and fine.  He is still not potty trained at 57 months.  He eats predominantly with his fingers, but is becoming more proficient with a spoon.  He has special educational needs for which he is currently being assessed and he has been held back at nursery, rather than progressing onto school with his contemporaries.  He continues to receive one to one support.  

13.	Whilst it has been said that he may need better than good enough care, at this stage I would confine myself to saying that he is a child with very particular needs that require his carer to have a particular understanding of his condition and needs, in the broadest sense, and the skill sets, or the ability to acquire them, to meet those very particular needs.  He is, by all accounts, a delightful child and, despite Mrs Morgan’s misgivings in August 2013 that he may not be such, is plainly a child who is extremely rewarding to parent, certainly at this stage.

14.	Second, the children’s father is a man with an extraordinarily difficult background.  Its relevance, of course, is that he is the son of PGM and an issue in the case is the outcome for the father, has to be reflected in her own care of her son, not just when he was in her care, which he was to the age of about ten, but the actions that she then took to keep abreast of and meet his needs, as his mother, notwithstanding the fact that he was by then in the care of his own grandfather and then, from 1996 onwards, aged 12, in and out of the care of the local authority.  PGM explains any shortcomings in her own discharge of responsibility to F as arising from her being young and, as she puts it, “silly”, or as she said to Mrs Morgan, “just a kid bringing up a kid.”  She points to the success that she has had with her two daughters that followed, T, who looks after children and lives nearby, aged 28, and PA from whom I heard.  

15.	The local authority nevertheless says that PGM’s acceptance or otherwise of the shortcomings, as well as some quite significant issues of reliability and maybe even honesty, are material considerations for the court in assessing her suitability to meet these children’s needs, particularly A, with whom, sadly, extensive professional involvement will be a continuing fact of life.  

16.	Third, throughout all of this history, these children have maintained a relationship through totally consistent, committed, reliable and high quality contact with M.  Thus, the issues that M potentially presents, not least through her continued contact with the children’s father, need also to be understood and, in deciding what is best, the ability of the children to continue to have a relationship with M is an important factor.  It would, of course be guaranteed, were they were to live with PGM with whom M has a very good, supportive relationship.  It is less clear, however, whether a form of open adoption that maintained the relationship could be achieved.  

17.	Accordingly, having mentioned these three separate topics, I need to consider the background insofar as it is relevant to the welfare analysis.  These were, as I have mentioned, the second set of proceedings regarding A.  Those issued in 2011 resulted in him being made the subject of a supervision order in August 2012.  During those proceedings there was considerable assessment of M, including psychiatric and psychological assessment and, in those, she was identified as a vulnerable person with a history of mental health difficulties, including attention deficit hyperactivity disorder, self-harming and depression.  That said, she had a history of engaging well with professionals, cooperating with them and, having demonstrated some capacity to make positive changes, had demonstrated her commitment to A.  

18.	The problem that recurred was her inability to separate from F, due to her emotional dependency on him, which in turn caused a lowering of the standard of care that she could offer A when she was in a relationship with him, as well as her ability to act openly and honestly with the local authority.  The psychological assessment, ultimately, concluded that she did not accept the seriousness of her misleading of professionals.  Her ability to safeguard A was conditional upon full cooperation and compliance with any conditions imposed on her. 

19.	Despite being granted a residence order, together with the supervision order, and no order for contact to F, it became clear that she continued to associate with him, challenged the local authority assertions to that effect, removed A from nursery and disengaged with the authority generally.  Evidence of cannabis use was found in her home in January 2013 when she was pregnant with B, following which she tested positive for cannabis against a background of denial of its use by her and she claimed that the unborn baby’s father was, in fact, somebody she had met on a one night stand, and not F.  

20.	Thus, the overall analysis, concisely put by the Guardian in her report in May, was that the mother could not prioritise the needs of the children over and above her own, she perceiving F as the man who saved her from herself, in that he stopped her self-harming.  In addition, her lifestyle choices had put her unborn baby at risk.  

21.	At the time that A was received into care in late February 2013 there was a constellation of concerns; cannabis use in the house; suspicion over the males who were gaining access to the house; a question as to whether that included F, who, as I say, M denied was the father of her unborn baby; a just about acceptable level of basic care, which was concerning given the high level of support that she had received since A was born; care that deteriorated once the support was reduced or F was on the scene.

22.	Thus, central to the concerns about M was F.  Born while his mother was a month short of her twentieth birthday, he was a child with significant behavioural problems, such that, as already mentioned, he went to live with his grandfather in Northumberland aged ten.  At a significantly geographical distance from his mother, voluminous social services’ records detail his problems thereafter.  In fact, those from Salford have never been disclosed, so the picture prior to 1994 is not very clear.  But those from Northumberland, which were the subject of a public interest immunity application, ran to 2,500 pages, of which a redacted bundle of less than 10% was produced.  By 1998, aged 13, the placement with his grandfather had broken down, due to his extreme behaviour, some of which was sexualised and violent.  The former social worker characterised him as:

“A man unwilling or unable to learn from experience, with no link being made between his behaviour and the appropriate consequences” 

23.	That included rewards as well as less good things.  It was unclear whether this was attributable to cognitive issues or the damage that he had suffered due to his childhood experiences.  Described as having learnt a perversely manipulative and destructive manner in his interaction with others, he functioned at a level of instant gratification and, when thwarted, resorted to deliberately aggressive, destructive and chaotic behaviour.  He seemed to lack empathy and remorse, being egocentric and, as such, a risk to both himself and others.  He was deemed not to meet the criteria for secure accommodation, but in residential placements his behaviour was difficult to manage, with threatening, destructive and damaging conduct, accompanied by allegations against members of staff.

24.	In December 2010 he returned home to his mother, but within six weeks she is recorded as reporting that she was struggling.  He obtained his own flat but by October 2002, he was homeless following eviction, and was shortly afterwards arrested for a knife point robbery and was sentenced to the first of a number of custodial sentences, at what was the beginning of a significant criminal career.

25.	A further problem has been his very marked antipathy towards Children’s Services, which he holds in poor repute, along with professionals in general and social workers in particular.  Thus, in the first set of care proceedings regarding A, the local authority’s ability to work with him was hampered by his aggression, he was extremely hostile to several social workers who tried to work with him, with a resultant lack of engagement, leading to the Guardian’s observation that he remained “an unassessed risk”.   Not surprisingly, there is also a history of mental health difficulties, which have been resistant to treatment.  

26.	Concerns arose about the use of cannabis in October 2010, in the home where A, a child with a vulnerable chest, lived.  Although aggressive and abusive to social workers, he did agree to leave the house.  A’s subsequent pneumonia revealed significant evidence of failure to thrive in the care of both parents.  The father’s considerable efforts to put obstacles in the way of the mother engaging in the assessment that followed via a mother and baby foster placement illustrates the problems arising from his interactions with her.  In making the supervision order, the Justices also made no order for contact and indicated that they could not see how there could be any progress without cooperation.  

27.	This is the context of the concerns that F presents and the interaction of those concerns with M, from whom, as I say, there is concern that she cannot permanently separate.

28.	Whilst the mother has engaged well in these proceedings, she has continued to be seen with him.  He has not engaged at all.  He made a statement in March in which he acknowledged many concerns, but denied much of the detail.  He indicated that he had decided to step away, to leave it to M to demonstrate that she could be a good parent for A and now B, asking for contact and noting that he has another child, a daughter, K, whom he is able to see.  He attended the first hearing in June and gave evidence but since then has neither filed evidence nor attended any hearing.  

29.	It is against that background, therefore, that the threshold criteria, at the June hearing, were not in issue on concessions being made by both parents and they are not in issue before me.  They are set out in the order of Judge Atherton, of 13th June 2014, and paraphrasing they are, first, the background of A having been the subject of a supervision order; second, the failure of both parents to protect the children from physical and emotional harm, citing amongst other things A’s poor growth and poor development; the use of cannabis by M when pregnant with B; the fact that M permitted youths into her property to use cannabis at the time of that pregnancy; M’s emotional dependency in the relationship with F, which has affected her ability to provide an appropriate standard of care to work cooperatively and positively with professionals and to prioritise the children’s needs; a failure to take A to a number of medical appointments; the removal of A from nursery against the advice of professionals; and the delay in his gaining weight, during her exclusive care in early 2013.

30.	I have mentioned the use of cannabis within the house.  That is also referred to against F, so far as A is concerned: this was at the time when A was being provided with supplemental oxygen for his chronic lung disease.  The third broad heading was the failure to meet and prioritise needs; the continuing of the relationship; the failure of F to work with the local authority and his attitude to it.  The fourth matter was the lack of insight and failure to work openly and honestly with professionals by both parents, with examples being given and I do not really think it is necessary for me to repeat in full the details which are cited in the order which is a matter of record.

31.	Not only is the threshold thereby met, and met in a significant way, as I have indicated, neither parent now seeks to care for the children, so for the purposes of this hearing the acute focus has been on the two realistic alternatives before the court, which in turn means that both the local authority proposal and that of PGM come under close scrutiny.  

32.	So I turn to the issues that this presents.  Having identified many positives in respect of PGM, to which I will turn, the local authority has nevertheless identified a series of risk factors that it says outweighs the positive factors.  There is a danger that in dealing with the positives shortly, they may seem to be afforded less weight than they deserve.  I am acutely conscious of that and I want to emphasise that they are at the forefront of my mind and I will come back to them.  But they were carefully enumerated, in particular by Mrs Morgan in her report and in bullet point form:

•	Her general capability
•	Her enormous patience with and delight in A’s presence
•	Her intelligence and obvious ability to be articulate on her and other’s behalf
•	Her positive outlook on life
•	Her ability to carry people with her in what ever she does
•	Her unstinting support for M
•	Her network of good and supportive friends, quite apart from the stability and endurance of her marriage
•	Her success in bringing up her two daughters, after F
•	Her very pleasant home
•	Her loving and hospitable nature
•	Her organisational skills
•	Her tenacity
•	Her commitment to the children against what may be thought to be many odds

	To this list Mr Wood added her capacity to meet the needs of the children which he felt was clear. 

33.	So, not forgetting those factors, the reasons why the local authority say that its proposal is the best one for A and B can be summarised as follows.  Under the broad heading of “risk”, that is the risk that placement with their grandparents would pose to the children, against the consistency of the care that the children have enjoyed to date and need in the future, there are these sub-headings.

34.	First, the risk posed by F generally and specifically how it could impact through contact, which for some time, at least, has not occurred.  

35.	Secondly, the role that M would play in the grandparents’ plan: would it be limited to relatively infrequent contact or would it turn, in effect, into a rehabilitation plan?

36.	Thirdly, the lack of clarity around the plan generally, particularly in relation to who the carers would be.

37.	Fourthly, the commitment of PGF to the plan.

38.	Fifthly, the understanding and expectations of the grandparents, with particular regard to A and his needs and their ability to meet the likely onerous requirements to meet them consistently.

39.	Sixthly, the practical problems posed by a significant geographical move, which would necessitate a transfer, not just in the children’s primary attachments, but to a change in the provision of all of A’s support services.  

40.	Underlying all of those sub-headings, to a greater or lesser extent, are issues of openness, honesty and insight on the part of the family members and their general ability to work with professionals, something that all agree is vital for A’s needs to be met and his chances to be maximised.

41.	The court, therefore, heard a good deal of evidence which is not going to be repeated here.  Chronologically, in terms of assessment and the Guardian aside, it was as follows.  First of all, Mrs Morgan, who prepared the Special Guardianship assessment in August 2013; second the written evidence of Lisa Bell, the social worker until September 2013; third the written and oral evidence of Julie Clark, the social worker since September 2013; fourth, the written and oral evidence of Chris Wood, the independent social worker who first reported in October 2014; fifth, the written and oral evidence of M; and finally, sixth, the written and oral evidence of PGF and PGM and their daughter, PA.

42.	It is clear that the issues of risk are matters of assessment and judgment, but the evidence on which those fall to be considered are ones of reliability which, in some instances, may amount to issues of honesty in respect of which findings will have to be made.  The burden, of course, rests on the local authority to prove its case and that includes the facts on which it relies.  It is not for any of the respondents to prove anything; the local authority proves its case by demonstrating on all of the evidence that the facts on which it relies are made out.  That is to say they are more likely than not to be correct, what the current President of the Family Division, as a puisne judge, described as “the stringent standard of proof” in accordance with Re H and R (Child Sexual Abuse: Standard of Proof) [1996] 1 FLR 80 and, I would add, more recently of course, Re B (A Child)[2013] UKSC33.

43.	So turning to this broad area of risk and beginning with F, all professionals, beginning with Lisa Bell, have pointed out his extremely difficult history, his unpredictability, and the risks which, over many years, he has been identified in posing.  Those concerns are magnified by his powerful negative view of authority in general and social workers in particular, such that as at October last year he remained an un-assessed risk, because he had been aggressive to social workers and had disrupted all attempts to work with them.

44.	Julie Clark adopted that, albeit acknowledged that he had not had any contact with A since early last year.  But in the context of the recognition of PGM as to the risk posed by her son on the one hand, noted that were he to be an active participant in the litigation, security would need to be present at hearings as he would likely “kick off”.  Yet, PGM’s position, having indicated that, was that she would be able to manage that behaviour.  Given the seriousness of those past behaviours, which remain unaddressed, a risk assessment by another independent social worker, Denise Gilley, in early 2014, was carried out to look at the issue of contact.

45.	He began that assessment to the social worker by stating his dislike of such professionals and his distrust of Children’s Services but said that he would work with her.  He likewise said he would be willing to access mental health services, but said that he had not done so.  The assessment concluded that he did not fully understand the concerns or the perception of the risk he posed; for example by being aggressive or abusive towards professionals, who may be involved with his children, indeed he may behave in such a way in their presence.  He could not see that any risk of an emotional nature existed in reintroducing him to A, at that stage and that professional concluded that, without a great deal of therapeutic input, he could not sustain a cooperative, working relationship with the local authority.

46.	Mrs Morgan and Mr Wood’s focus on F was in respect of another issue and so they do not specifically address the risk posed by F himself, whom neither of them met.  

47.	PGM’s evidence has variously been first that F has now turned his life round and become a “totally changed person” in the last year: that was in her statement in October 2013.  She said:

“He was no angel but now a grown man, knows right from wrong and believes his way is the right way and nothing will change his mind.”

48.	That was the same statement.  Likewise:

“He may hold a lot of grudges against her, but he is older and should be wiser.”

49.	More recently, in June this year she said that :

“He has issues and faults, but a lot of people are worse than him.”

50.	He would:

“Never hurt the kids.”  “All he ever wanted was to be a good dad.”

51.	She said:

“If you let him see his children on his own, you would see a big difference.”

52.	She said:

“He understands and is more than happy for them to live with her, only asking that they be kept safe and that he receives photographs.”

53.	In November she said to me that:

“F should now give up hope, because he’s not been committed, he should have been at court.  If he turned up with the children in my care, I would tell him to go to court.”

54.	Acknowledging past arguments in cross examination, she said more than once that his bark was worse than his bite; she said that although he had been horrible to professionals they had not been nice to him.

“I can’t say he poses a risk, I haven’t seen that.  He has been amazing and faultless when I’ve seen him.  If he doesn’t get his own way he barks a lot and makes threats.  I ignore him.  The children would be safe with me.”

55.	This was an echo of what she had said to Mrs Morgan, who had noted PGM’s surprise at the notion of him being a risk.  

56.	PGF said simply:

“I get on with F and we’ve only ever had one argument.”

57.	He said that he did not have much to do with him and did not think he was any form of risk.

58.	Finally, in terms of managing the risk, Julie Clark was concerned that PGM’s attitude was that they would allow contact between F and the children if the local authority permitted it, rather than recognising the risk themselves and managing it appropriately.  

59.	The second area of risk relates to M and, so far as that is concerned, there is clear and agreed evidence regarding the quality and value of her contact.  Indeed, there is no reason why, if the children are in the PGM/PGF care, that should not continue at a rate that is commensurate with the distances that would be involved in facilitating it.  That is not an issue in the case, but what the local authority’s concern is would be how that might develop.  I heard evidence from Tanya Mitcheson, the proprietor of a taxi company used by the local authority to facilitate contact, in which she described overhearing a conversation on the August Bank Holiday weekend in 2013, between M and PGM, in which she said that PGM said that once she got custody of the children and moved them to Manchester, then after a suitable pause M could move over and take over.  PGM had also said that she was unhappy about giving up her job as the local authority had required.  Mrs Mitcheson explained how it was part of her responsibility to report to the local authority things that might be of concern, hence her noting this conversation and reporting it within 24 hours.

60.	M was not asked about the conversation at all in this hearing, but, in any event, denied previously the conversation and any intention to take over care of the children.  She recognised that them staying with their grandmother was their only chance of staying in the family.  PGM’s response to the report was that:

“It was one hundred per cent fabrication; it is never going to happen.”

61.	But she added that M had said, maybe in a few years time, she would try for the children, which she had questioned with her, by asking whether she really would do that, knowing where they were, to which there was no clear answer. 

62.	The third risk factor relates to the plan.  Given the length of time this case has been going on, it is not surprising that the plan has changed from time to time.  PGM told me that it was her intention to give up work.  She would have to give a month’s notice.  So the plan would be that she could be with B, as A was out at school, and she would go to toddler groups with B and fit those in round A’s many appointments with, for example, speech and language therapy, educational needs, physiotherapy and medical problems generally as they arose.  

63.	Mrs Morgan had recorded, and this was at a time when PGM was laid up with an injury, that she would return to work when she was better, put A into a private nursery or Sure Start, each afternoon, to be collected by her husband or PA.  She would continue to work from Monday to Thursday, from 4pm to 8pm as a hotel receptionist, so one of those two adults could then put the children to bed.  B, in those circumstances, would be cared for by her friends, D and E, from 4pm to 7pm on Monday to Thursday, with PGF or PA doing bedtimes.  She acknowledged that if people required it, she would be prepared to give up work; to Mr Wood she said that she would intend to give up work, “for a year or two”, to help the children settle and cement relationships.  Asked about what she had said to Mrs Morgan, she denied giving the impression that she was going back to work at all.  

64.	The fourth risk factor relates to PGF.  Whilst it is acknowledged by all that the driving force behind this plan is PGM and that, I emphasise, is not a criticism of either of them, the proposal is, to a considerable extent, dependent upon PGF being in support and willing to play his part.  Although he attended the final hearing and gave evidence at some length, his role in this has been said to be somewhat shadowy from the beginning.  He has had very little contact with the children.  When Mrs Morgan went to assess him she described her upset, having gone especially to Manchester to do this over the course of two evenings, when he cancelled the second session, because he had made arrangements to travel to Newcastle in a hire car, in circumstances that prevented the second session from taking place.  She found him hard to interview.  She said most of his answers were monosyllabic and she formed the impression that it was all PGM’s plan which he was going along with, noting that there was a report from the foster carer that he said he had not wanted the children, but his wife had said, “it’ll be okay.”

65.	Quite apart from the concern that it is PGM who makes the decisions and then it is her business to carry everyone else along with it, it worried Mrs Morgan that he might struggle to oppose her, when some restraint was required.  Mr Wood formed an altogether more favourable impression.  He noted a different personality and, whilst accepting some reluctance and a failure to be forthcoming, or as he put it “sharing in an emotional sense”, felt that PGF was accepting and that he was fully committed, as part of a family obligation, to the plan and gave descriptions consistent with taking on a fatherly role, which he described in terms of being a permanent commitment.  

66.	He also identified, as had PGM and PA, PGF as very much a caring and family-orientated man, who had always been closely involved in the day to day care of the children within the household and fully supportive of it.  Indeed, both PGM and PA described him in extremely warm and loving terms and nothing that PGF said to me suggested that this was in any way contrived.  He accepted to me that he had had reservations initially, but he had been won round, saying that his wife would be the primary carer and he would help out when he could.  The success that he and his wife had had with their daughter, PA, was fully in evidence when she went into the witness box.  She is an attractive young woman, in every sense of the word, she is a credit to her parents, making her way well in life, as Mr Stonor properly underlined.  However, A, in particular, does not have the same potential that PA plainly had.  It was therefore surprising to hear PGF say that he had not read any of the papers in this case, despite this being a joint application for Special Guardianship, and he had but the sketchiest understanding of A’s delayed development, little understanding of his medical needs and was able to comment that A’s delayed walking, at 38 months, was a feature of “kids picking things up differently at different ages.”

67.	Of direct relevance, said the local authority, to commitment was the much argued over failure of contact at the end of October.  Mr Wood had not had the opportunity to see PGF with the children in contact and, given the fact that he was proposed to be one of their special guardians, the court agreed that this should be made to happen if at all possible.  It was complicated by the need to arrange it at a weekend, but the local authority accepted the necessity.  It did not happen owing to a problem with a hire car which was never delivered.  PGF was quite clear that the fault rested entirely with the local authority.  Assuming that he is right about that for present purposes, what really mattered was his response.  Whilst he had objected in the first instance to the adequacy of the car that he had been offered, the local authority go on to point to his failure to take any steps to come to Northumberland, despite the importance of this contact, which had been specifically asked for by Mr Wood and who had made the request at the time that he had produced a report which was supportive of PGM and PGF in their application.  PGF variously told me that it was too late to hire another car, certainly at an affordable price; it was too late to book a train and, in any event, he did not use trains and was “not familiar with the process”.  

68.	Asked about the report that he had gone on to have a drink that night when the car did not turn up, he agreed he had had one or two pints, but denied that he had thereby communicated his intention not to travel at all.  

“Social services had messed up the arrangements.”

69.	In the course of this, Ellie Tamhne, the social worker involved in making those arrangements, had asked PGM for her husband’s phone number so that she could contact him direct.  PGM accepted that she had refused point blank to give it because he was “furious”.  He plainly agreed with that decision:

“I just didn’t want to give it to them.  It’s my personal number.  I pay the bill, and it’s up to me who I give it to.”

70.	The fifth risk area related to understanding and expectations of the grandparents.  Insofar as PGF is concerned, I have referred to his evidence on this topic.  The important evidence so far as PGM is concerned comes from the current social worker, Mrs Morgan and Mr Wood.  

71.	Mrs Clark expressed her concern that on a number of occasions PGM referred to A as “being okay” and drew attention to a comment that she had made to A about being in nappies, but he would not be once he was in Manchester.  She took that as a rather unhelpful implication that the foster carers have not tried, whereas in fact the local authority position is that they recognise that this is something that he is simply not ready for and will do in his own time.  It also, said the local authority, pointed to evidence of lack of insight, into his developmental delay.  Although she had seen papers, she had not been to many of the appointments with A to see at first hand exactly what they entailed, but it has to be said these were observations made by Mrs Clark in passing and not based on assessment, because that had been carried out by Mrs Morgan.  

72.	She was concerned at a number of levels.  There was first of all what she took to be the ready acceptance of the parents’ original plan to move from Manchester to Northumberland, shortly after A’s discharge from hospital, after the most difficult imaginable start to life.  Second, although PGM’s enthusiasm and stated commitment were admirable and evidence of strong potential for success, A’s needs, which include extensive stimulation as well as all the other matters of routines and boundaries, were such that she was not able to predict that PGM could carry this through.  Pointing to the difficulties with F’s upbringing, something she was not prepared to dismiss as PGM did, she feared that enthusiasm and commitment alone were not enough to see this process through.

73.	She cited PGM’s failure to respond to the post box contact for F’s older child, L, not thus far mentioned, because of her anger at being denied the chance for L to be placed with her, as a stark example of the difficulty that she might have working with professionals at the intensity necessary for A.  She expressed concern at PGM’s ability to provide consistent care, already mentioned, under the issue of the plan and her worry if, at some stage, A demonstrates difficulty or rejecting behaviour, what her reaction would be, seemingly not recognising this as a distinct possibility.

74.	Having encouraged her to undergo some training in attachment issues as well as some more general parenting, focused on a child with special needs, she was disappointed that PGM had not done this and had interpreted her advice as only applying if the children were definitely coming to her.  Having considered the more recent evidence of contact with its issues over food, hygiene, nappies and so on, she felt that her assessment of PGM, thinking it will all be alright, was confirmed and pointed to a failure to understand or respect a child with special needs.  She was also concerned about risk, especially from F, which PGM dismissed on the basis that the would not hurt a child, without any thought for the aggression that F is capable of showing to people with whom he disagrees, regardless of who is there, something that PGM had acknowledged, as I have mentioned.

75.	Mr Wood, having noted that A needed “a highly committed, proactive and patient attitude”, on the part of his carers, felt in his initial report that the evidence showed a positive and enquiring interest, asking about and taking an interest in developmental issues and being attuned to practical care needs of both children, something he felt was borne out in his assessment of PGM’s contact.  He concluded that she was “resourceful, motivated and capable” at providing appropriate stimulation and a capacity to meet needs to a good level.  However, he went on to conclude that the understanding of both grandparents of A’s needs was somewhat vague and seemed to be rather poorly informed, especially given the information that PGM said she had received in the form of reports.

76.	In an echo of what Mrs Morgan had said, he also sensed that she took a rather optimistic view of the demands and potential difficulties, particularly from A, but recognised the need to work with professionals.  He, like Mrs Morgan, thought she would benefit from help regarding attachment and outreach support, albeit he differed from her as to the best source of this.  Overall, however, he was positive. 

77.	By the time Mr Wood came to give evidence, he remained of the view that PGM recognised A’s delay and continued to have the capacity to meet his needs, with professional support, making as he put it a placement “possible”, with willingness and cooperation.  Set against that, however, were his earlier misgivings about PGM’s ability to work with professionals which had increased, something he went on to put in writing before he gave his oral evidence and repeated in answer to my questions. Indeed, he did so to the point that he felt simply unable to make a recommendation.  

78.	Asked by Mr Spain about PGM’s capacity to meet A’s needs, he said that she had accepted he had significant delay but had no clear understanding of what it entailed and how it translated into progress, as well as day to day care.  Having formed a negative view of the foster carers, as she has, PGM had thereby cut herself off from the opportunity to have a continuing dialogue, which could only have helped her understand.  Overall, his view seems to have been that the capacity is there to understand, but what he characterised as her “belligerent” and difficult approach to professionals had got in the way of developing that understanding.  Cooperation, he said, was the crux and if PGM and PGF cannot or will not cooperate, then they will not develop the capacity.  He told PGM direct as she questioned him that the background information about F showed that there had been a less than forthcoming attitude, where she had not been proactive in seeking to work for his benefit.  All of his positive observations about capacity were, in effect, qualified by this proviso.  

79.	Looking a the degree of confidence he had in assessing risk, whilst the grandparents were generally resourceful and capable, noting the recommendation for some attachment training, he said he had reflected on their perspective that they need not do this until they knew they were getting the children and said:

“On reflection, it doesn’t stack up.”

80.	He pointed to the historic lack of pro-activity regarding F and he felt that this was again evident in not seeking out knowledge about A’s needs.  Whilst the foster carers would and should play a central role in any transfer of care, he was unsure of how that was going to work, citing her accusations of “sabotage” by them and her intolerance of the relationship that they have with the children.  He was disappointed that he had sensed no shift in attitude.

81.	PGM pointed to her undoubted and unflinching commitment, but there is little in any of her statements that even refers to, let alone acknowledges the problems that A has.  However, she told me that having been closely involved from the time of his birth, she knew how vulnerable he was; she knew he needed better than normal care and said that he was delightful, responsive and had not oppositional behaviours.  She said if she had the support that the foster carers had received, she would be able to provide all of that and more and she would cooperate and accept advice.  She said she would welcome any help with preparatory work, but she denied the correctness of Mr Wood’s characterisation of her approach to professionals.  

82.	The sixth factor was one I have headed “practical problems”.  The local authority having pointed to the level of help and support that A requires, made contact with the local authority where the grandparents live to ascertain the support services on offer, to support Special Guardianship.  In the long letter from its Legal Services Department, dated 13th October 2014, it essentially draws attention to regulation 5 of the Special Guardianship Guidance 2005 which imposes the duty on assessment and provision of services on the local authority where the child was last looked after.  Therefore, under each of the headings, it points out what this local authority’s responsibility is, essentially total responsibility, and indicates that it will not be carrying out any assessments of its own.

83.	Northumberland’s response to this has been to point it out as yet another risk.  Mr Wood took a fundamentally different view.  Noting that geographical and practical considerations present logistical difficulties, he said they were not insurmountable, and can be managed by the local authority commissioning services.  With an imaginative approach this can be achieved and the only real problem that could contribute to delay was in respect of a statement of special educational needs as this assessment has started but is not yet to hand.  

84.	Those are the six specific risks identified by the local authority.  But there is the broad, overarching concern that I have mentioned of openness, honesty, ability to work, and insight.  That arises from the very considerable historic background.  The court is invited by the local authority and the Guardian to conclude that it is directly relevant to the findings that should be made about the risks that I have referred to and the extent to which those risks are real and manageable.  Although there have been issues in the lifetime of this litigation, the story really begins a long time ago with F and his troubled childhood.  The issue really arose in acute form because Mrs Morgan, when she assessed the grandparents and visited them at home, formed a generally favourable impression.  She, however, qualified it by saying she would need to look at the historic papers to understand how F’s circumstances came about and were managed because they were directly relevant to her assessment.

85.	By contrast, PGM says there was no such qualification.  She was effectively given the go ahead to prepare for the arrival of the children.  Whatever the true position, and I will make a finding, but if it was the latter I agree it was very unfortunate,  Mrs Morgan did go to look at the records and reached a conclusion that PGM had limited insight into what had gone wrong, was dismissive of blame and this reduced her confidence that history would not repeat itself, particularly if A were to demonstrate problematic behaviour in the future.  

86.	The family’s response has been one of hurt betrayal, with each of PGM and PGF and PA characterising Mrs Morgan’s report as full of lies, misrepresentations and inaccurate recordings.  PA called it “a farce”.  

87.	When he wrote his initial report, Mr Wood had access to the Special Guardianship report, but concluded that PGM’s subsequent parenting experience rendered the historic concerns irrelevant to A and B.  Provided with the same source material, he produced an addendum.  Overall, he felt the information was of limited assistance, but he did note a striking consistency in the account, particularly as to the extent to which PGM remained on contact with her son.  He also noted evidence then of resistance to professional support in resolving conflict, rigid and stubborn attitudes, and he noted PGM’s difficulty in explaining that intransigence to him.  This latter concern ultimately was central to his final decision that he could not make a recommendation.  

88.	I am not going to descend into minute detail.  There is a vast amount of material.  But of relevance to a decision is Mrs Morgan’s evidence and PGM’s response.  Mrs Morgan told me that the account given to her of PGM being “a kid bringing up a kid” simply did not fit with the records.  Mrs Morgan conceded she was only 18 when he was born; in fact, as I have said, she was a month off 20.  F was, she said, eight or nine: I think he was ten, when he left Manchester and did so in circumstances where PGM did not realise that his problems needed extra special care and that he needed her as his mother.  She could not characterise the handing over of F to his grandfather, apparently something that F himself then wanted, as simple immaturity.  

89.	Whatever, there was then, Mrs Morgan felt, a mis-match between what PGM said she was doing, or not doing, and the records.  Most striking, was her denial of any real understanding of what was happening to F in Northumberland.  That includes matters such as the fact that he went into care, which she said she thought was just for respite; that she had no understanding of the level of concerns; did not attend meetings because she was not invited by the local authority.  That latter statement was apparently contradicted by the local authority records, because on their being produced they listed her as being in attendance at, certainly many, meetings.  By way of response, PGM said it was not beyond her brother to bring an imposter along to such meetings to pose as her.

90.	The absence of any involvement of course provided support for her surprise that F was considered a physical and sexual threat, as well as more generally why he was in care and just how challenging he could be.  Mrs Morgan said:

“It was incredible to believe that a mother with parental responsibility could have a child taken into care and not know how or why.”

91.	She could not reconcile what PGM said about being shocked because she had reported that she could not believe what she had read in the records when she eventually received them, PGM saying in terms that she had never been told bad things about F, only positive things.  

92.	Mrs Morgan’s conclusion, reliability aside, was that she was not a person with much insight and, in saying, as she put it regarding F, “this is where I was and this is where I went and no remorse was shown”, for F’s terrible childhood and outcome.  She was extremely concerned.  

93.	Taken to the records, it seemed to me that Mr Wood notably hardened his position.  Taken to the key ones by Mr Flower he agreed that there was a clear difference between what they recorded and what PGM reported.  He reminded me that he had in his first report alluded to her vague approach to historic concerns and he said he would have expected her to have been aware of them, or had a greater awareness.  He noted that she had been reluctant to attend appointments and that that did inform his concerns about a lack of a proactive approach in accessing services.  Pressed, he agreed that the explanations lacked credibility, and went beyond unreliability.  He had found her to be not just avoidant and vague but in denial.  The records put all that into question and he said that in the context of this case, the more stark the continued denials the more, of course, his index of concern as to her ability to be open, rises. 

94.	Having already quoted from PGM’s statement, she told me that she felt that she told Mrs Morgan all she could remember about F.  She had read the reports now and repeated that she could not honestly believe what she was reading and the fact that the news had all been good.  When asked if she was not a good mother at the time, she said:

“I didn’t do anything bad, I should have just been a bit stronger.  I was bad for not being strong enough to keep him with me.  I gave in too easily I suppose.”

95.	Mr Spain took her through the records.  Her responses were in the main that she either did not know or it did not happen.  An example of both is F reporting soiling to annoy her; she did not know that.  He also reported that she had rubbed faeces in his face.  She said that did not happen and F had admitted that that was a lie.  As to why F would tell such a lie, there does not appear to be an explanation.  She did not know, for example, that F had been referred to the Nuffield Unit, which is a regional unit that deals with children with extreme behavioural problems in 1995, because by then his grandfather was at the end of his tether, or his behaviour was out of control.  She did not know of the local authority referral and F going to care, other than on a respite basis.  She did not know he had been excluded from school, or had had multiple placements.  She could not remember that he had a special educational needs assessment.  She could not remember being invited to attend a child protection conference when F said he had been hit by his grandfather.  She could not recall that at attempt to return home in 1998 broke down because of his behaviour.  As these matters were put to her, and others, she said:

“It’s all just as blurred as it was.”

96.	F’s arrest and conviction for robbery, he was sentenced to three years’ detention aged 16, a significant sentence, was something she was aware of, but although he had been present when it had happened, she seemed to indicate that she did not really think that he was guilty of that with which he was charged.  She agreed that the disclosed documents were relevant and that they showed a detailed history of F and the involvement of numerous agencies as well as her.  

“I don’t remember half of it and didn’t know half of it.”

97.	Even being shown correspondence addressed to her at her home and the records of her attendance at meetings did not help.  She said:

“I can’t say I didn’t receive invitations, but I can’t remember.”

98.	Before assessing these issues, I should say something about the key witnesses.  I was denied the chance to hear from Lisa Bell, which I regret, particularly because of PGM’s belief as to the good quality of the relationship she enjoyed with her.  It was her view that the case took off in a different direction on the arrival of the present social worker whom she characterised as putting obstacles in her way, trying to make her out to be stupid, being damned if she does and also if she does not.  She felt that she was being made out to be a bad person, unfairly, admitting that she had lost her temper with Ms Tamhne, over the taxi fiasco, but said it was a one off due to frustration.  She felt the local authority had not been truthful in pursuit of an agenda to ensure that the foster carers could adopt the children and that evidence had been used against her and her family was all hearsay.  It was felt she had not been given a chance to develop a relationship with the children and in that she had support from the independent social worker, who, although he qualified his report when he said that the local authority had made no efforts to help PGM understand the requirements and routines of the children, still said the local authority could have done more.

99.	So that criticism is all directed at June Clark, who has been the children’s social worker for 15 months.  Her evidence, in the court’s judgment, demonstrated a very good detailed understanding of the children and their needs.  She acknowledged all the positives about PGM and PGF identified by Mrs Morgan and commented herself on the obvious warmth and love that exists.  But in presenting the concerns the local authority had, did, I accept, give an overall negative impression.  She was unqualifiedly positive about M and her contact, in the most difficult of circumstances, including several failures by the local authority to ensure that arranged contact took place.  While she remained concerned about continued contact between the parents, she was amenable to discussions taking place about post-adoption contact if a placement order was made.  It seemed to the court that she demonstrated thereby an open and receptive mind.  She stressed that she had not assessed PGM and PGF as that had been done by Mrs Morgan and she said that the local authority would have endorsed positively them asking for help that would increase their understanding, be it courses or seeking more information.  She told PGM that she had no issue, for example, with A “having a go at feeding himself”, as PGM put it, but made the point that, hand in glove with that, was the responsibility to ensure that A had enough to eat.  There was evidence of that from contact.  She expressed concern at the fact that the only level of communication with the foster carers was via the communication book and commented on the high level of emotion that PGM has shown towards them.   

100.	As I said, overall I was impressed by Mrs Clark who I felt had a good understanding of the issues, her evidence was thoughtful, it was clearly evidence based and I did not form any sense that it was being advanced as part of a pre-judged agenda.  One of the profound difficulties with this case is the polarisation that has arisen because of the position of the foster carers.  It does make for a very awkward dynamic and it is one that, frankly, has interfered with the objective analysis that confronts the court.  It should not have been permitted to arise.  But the evidence is clear that the foster carers only asked for this to be considered once the local authority had formulated its plan for permanence, as is evident from Lisa Bell’s final statement, and Mrs Clark, in her statement in November 2013 openly acknowledges how unfortunate that has been.  It was, I repeat.  It is something that the local authority must not countenance in other cases.  But I consider that, in the circumstances, she has continued to approach this case appropriately, fairly and in a balanced manner.  

101.	I have already described Mrs Morgan’s enormous experience and background.  Her report was impressive, detailed and closely argued.  She spent several hours with PGM, both in Northumberland and Manchester; she recognised how unfortunate it was she had not seen F’s records before visiting his mother, describing her increasing concern and distress as she went on to read them; something that took her a day.  She accepted that she may have unwittingly left PGM and PGF with the impression that the outcome would be positive, but she insisted that she did communicate the need to read the records and when she did the mis-match between what had happened and how it had been reported to her became clear.  

102.	Because of the way that it was done, she was denied the chance to consider PGM’s response to her findings and challenges, but ultimately that is, of course, the court’s job.  That she had a premonition that all was not as it seemed, was clear when she said to me:

“I can leave a house …” here she was talking about Manchester, “… quite happy, but when I put it together in my mind, all the things you remember reinforce one route or another.  Re-reading sometimes reveals patterns.  I was enthusiastic about her friends; her house was pleasant; she was relaxed; but there were other things to consider.  The records, why did F become the boy he did?”

103.	And so on.  When she had performed that task, she felt things just did not add up.  Like it or not, right or wrong, this is a comprehensive, thoughtful and insightful report, compellingly presented by Mrs Morgan.

104.	Mr Wood came into the case late, an experienced, measured and conspicuously reflective and fair minded social worker.  As I have said, he initially reached a different conclusion to Mrs Morgan.  Even when the concerns that the local authority and Guardian had about his evidence were pointed out, much was based on self-report without sight of the documents and the absence of challenge, his view did not fundamentally change in his addendum, albeit some of his concerns increased, particularly over the attitude to professionals.  He was critical of the local authority’s failure to do more and to communicate his expectations, better facilitate contact and to challenge the rather negative response of the authority in the north west.  He also wanted to know why the contact arrangements for him to see PGF had failed.  

105.	Thus it was that when he entered the witness box, called by the court, as the Guardian felt unable to present him as her witness, he had produced in writing a list of positives and negatives and found himself unable to make a recommendation, a position he held to, having spent a significant part of the day in the witness box.  It was plainly not a comfortable position to be in, but it showed that he was able, throughout, to maintain that degree of detachment one expects from an expert witness and so one can be confident of the degree of balance and objectivity.  Ultimately, it is for the court to make the findings and to balance the positives and negatives, based on robust analysis and I should say he was a considerable assistance to the court in that regard.  

106.	I will address the Guardian’s evidence in due course, but let me turn to the family members.  M was a very attractive and sympathetic witness.  There was, certainly before the court, little of her difficult past apparent.  She maintains her support for PGM and PGF and denies that F poses any recent risk, never seeking to join her contact, for example.  She went on to say that he was no risk to her or her children and she could see no problem with him having contact.  She felt the local authority had made up its mind in favour of the foster carers and was critical of that and unrepentant in her views about it.  She felt that, had she or PGM and PGF had the support that they had had, they would have been in a different place.  She was clear in her denial of any intention to move from the north east and her focus was on the children going to the north west and maintaining her contact, whatever the outcome.  

107.	Of the paternal family I heard PA first: 20 years old, decent, straight forward, well meaning young woman who is a credit to her parents.  Based on her, as Mr Stonor said, her character can be shown to be demonstrably good.  I have no doubt that she intends to be a significant part of the children’s lives, if they live with her parents, and that can only be to their benefit.  She praised her parents in fulsome terms, with pride, and shared their criticism of the local authority.  I did not doubt her claim that she would seek to provide the usual support of an involved aunt.  

108.	PGF gave evidence at the adjourned hearing.  I think he too is a fundamentally decent, hard working, loving family man, much respected as well as loved by his nearest and dearest.  He is not demonstrative.  He is, I suspect, pretty quiet and represents the antidote to his wife, who is the more extrovert, being a woman of energy, enthusiasms and a decision maker.  He acknowledged his initial reservations, but described the family conference from which their plan emerged.  He was very critical of the local authority.  Mrs Morgan’s report, he said, was full of lies: on reflection on what he had said, or been asked about what she had lied over, he said he could not remember.

109.	As he was pressed, I was particularly concerned with his apparent lack of curiosity in relation to the issues that this court is concerned with; A’s needs; F’s problems; his attitude to professionals; the apparent inability to be flexible.  Whether these are a part of his approach to life generally, or a commitment to the case in particular, I will discuss, but there are issues to consider in terms of capacity to meet very specific needs.  None of this detracts from his fundamental decency and I would not want anyone to think otherwise.  

110.	PGM can properly and fairly be described as a force of nature.  The lengths to which she has gone to ensure that her grandchildren stay in the family were summed up by PA when she said:

“I don’t know how you’ve done it, I take my hat off to you, you have done everything asked of you, fighting for your family.”

111.	Conducting the case unrepresented from the other side of the Pennines was hard enough.  Succeeding first time round and having her hopes dashed by the appeal and, I suspect, the change in Mr Wood’s position, did nothing to dent her enthusiasm or her good humour, which was evident throughout the hearing, despite no doubt having to listen to some very difficult evidence.  Her love, commitment and determination are not in question; what are include her optimism, which Mrs Morgan characterised as “enthusiasm taking over from reality” and the historic issues of F, which the professionals simply cannot dismiss and move on from, as she would wish.

112.	She said in closing she was not a bad person.  It was one of the few times I interrupted her to contradict her and I repeat that contradiction now.  Nobody is suggesting that she is a bad person and this court does not for one moment believe that.  

113.	The historic concerns, despite PGM’s response to them, are, in my judgment, fundamental to the issues in this case.  Having considered all of the evidence, I agree with Mrs Morgan that they simply cannot be dismissed as she asks.  First, I do not agree that PGM was “a kid bringing up a kid”; she was nearly 20 in fact, so she was young, but she was not a kid.  But perhaps of more significance, is the fact that she was in her late 20s when she effectively abandoned his care to his grandfather.  

114.	Second, I do not know whether the hurt of what happened to F and her failure to meet his needs has caused her to blank out these events, or whether she is simply denying and minimising these matters, or a combination of the two.  But either way, it is of limited assistance because she either has unresolved issues concerning what appears to have been her ready handing over of the care of her son, or she has not been wholly truthful.  Unresolved issues would themselves be concerning, particularly given F’s outcome.  Truthfulness would be concerning for other reasons.  We simply do not understand how she could part so readily from her young son and then go on to play such a limited role in his troubled upbringing thereafter.  

115.	I suspect that there is an element of both.  I think she may have blanked some of it out and she may also have forgotten some of the detail, but I cannot accept that she has blanked to the point that she asserts that she was only told the good things and none of the bad.  Whilst I cannot point to those things that she does remember and those things that she does not remember, she has minimised its seriousness and her role in it.

116.	Next, on any objective analysis, she did, as I say, abandon the care of a young child, her first child, not just to another family member but to another part of the country and one has to ask the question why?  The answer is, with respect, obvious.  She found him too difficult to deal with and, when confronted with such issues there is, as Mrs Morgan said, a pattern beginning with F being sent to his grandfather.

117.	Next, even when he came back and she could not cope, she sought to send him back.  When he ended up in prison she implies that he should not really have been sent there in the first place.  

118.	Next, when it was put to her that F was also a child with special needs, she denied it.  She described him as “a normal little boy until his teens”.  That is demonstrably not so.

119.	Next, mentioned only in passing thus far, is F’s child, L.  When another local authority declined to place that child with her, because of sibling issues, she simply cut off contact, explained by her saying that she was too angry.  So, although she now happily receives newsletters, by way of indirect contact, she does not respond directly to the child, or his carers, but puts the response in a box to be available when the child is old enough: a course which seems to have very little thought or empathy for how that might assist or meet that child’s needs.

120.	Next, the decision of A’s parents to move back to the north east is another example.  Too ready to accept the social work assessment at the time that there would be help available to them and to consider that a sufficient safeguard against all that she knew about the issues the parents had and A, her response was that they were adults and capable of making their own decisions.  Not only did she not stand in their way, but she felt reinforced by M being “amazing”, without any thought as to whether that was really sustainable.  I do question how hard she kept in contact thereafter, given her ignorance of A’s life threatening illness.  It was, frankly, not until 2013 that serious attempts to reintroduce herself to A were made.  

121.	She thereby demonstrated what I accept from Frances Morgan was a nonchalant attitude, an optimism that all would be alright and allowed enthusiasm to take over from reality.  Unfortunately, it has taken two sets of care proceedings and a likely plan of permanence outside the family to realise that that might not be so. 

122.	Mr Wood said that if PGM was unable to justify her denials and explain them in some way which is understandable and was able to give confidence that she would be more forthcoming in the future, he would be much more concerned.  It seems to me that she is really wholly unable to justify her denials, or at least explain them in a comprehensible way, and it is not limited to her, because her husband was equally vague, if not in denial.  

123.	He described F’s leaving as something that he vaguely remembered and it was not discussed.  I accept that his relationship within the family was then new, but giving up the care of a boy of F’s age was a massive step for any mother to take.  The grandfather, PGGF said, did a good job of caring for F, he thought.  He vaguely remembered some bad behaviour when he came to stay.  Whether or not there was a major row, as the record suggests, the descriptions do not begin to reflect what is known of F.  Likewise PGF said that  L was only mentioned a few times and he knew little about him, “but I guess it’s a pretty difficult thing”.  

124.	These are historic concerns of reliability and insight, but those affecting F are of such a profound nature that they cannot be dismissed when looking at the future.  Mrs Morgan’s concern that PGM’s optimism causes her to be carried away remains evident.  First of all, I do not accept that Mrs Morgan gave PGM “the green light”.  I am sure that she made positive noises, as she herself conceded, but her professionalism is such that I reject the idea of an unqualified go ahead, without looking at the records, which as we know painted a different picture.  PGM is, I think, a lady who hears and acts on what she wants to hear and ignores that which may be less welcome, on the basis that it will be alright in the end.  That was a particularly good example. 

125.	The hire car fiasco is, in part, similarly explained.  PGM had what, to her, was a good practical idea of hiring a car to go to contact.  She pointed out, almost certainly rightly, it would be cheaper for the local authority too, but she ignored Ms Tamhne’s understandable warning that there were bureaucratic niceties to overcome.  That the car did not turn up, that the local authority booked, was not the local authority’s fault, it was actually the hire company’s fault.  But that the local authority arrangement failed, is subject to heightened criticism because PGM had the better idea, she would hire it herself and had taken steps to put it in place.  There are other examples, given by Mrs Morgan and it is not really helpful to add to an already over long judgment.  

126.	Mrs Morgan, in answer to Mr Stonor, characterised the grandmother’s decision regarding F, when he tried to put it in the context of her, PGM, then being in an abusive relationship and suffering depression, as a good, pragmatic answer.  Off he goes with his grandfather, the burden is off, somebody else can take over the job which she was herself unable to do.  It almost did not need to be said, but Mrs Morgan did anyway:

“If she found herself unable to deal with A, she would turn round and give him to someone else who could.”

127.	That is why to her and the local authority this issue is so important.  An obvious safeguard would be a network of support.  It would have to be professional in A’s case, but that requires cooperation and, whilst on the one hand she and PA say they have done everything asked of them, there is a history that tells a different tale.  F’s history is replete with instances and one of Mrs Morgan’s justified comments is how MGM has really learned so little, nothing, she put it, from what has gone wrong.   Also, in part, again from Mrs Morgan, it is PGM making decisions and then seeking to carry everyone along with her.  Her family does that and, having seen her husband, I think that it is something that broadly suits his personality.  But it does not work with professionals as she has found out.  

128.	Mr Wood, who had been so well impressed by her, described her personalisation of the deterioration in relationships.  That was evident in something which, in the scale of things, was a frustration over the hire car, an understandable one, but not one that it was worth “losing it over.”  Those were her words in respect of the conversation she had with Ms Tamhne, “livid” and “furious”.  So far as Mr Wood was concerned, he characterised it as “belligerent” and “oppositional”.  It is born of frustration of course, but it is nevertheless not conducive to a working relationship that operates to the benefit of the children.

“A concerning attitude … “ he said “… one would expect her to be much more tolerant in her attitude to help.”

129.	Mr Wood was particularly critical of PGM’s attitude towards the foster carers, describing it as “less than reasonable” and a cause for a good degree of concern.  The failure in that relationship denied her a chance to learn and develop her understanding and he was disappointed at the absence of a shift in attitude. 

130.	In such circumstances, the deficit that arises can sometimes be counter-balanced by the other half, the partner, but here PGF was said to be fuming over the hire car a week later and, if that was so, Mr Wood said it was evidence of him being difficult and obstructive and he most certainly was over his mobile phone.  

131.	Reverting to PGM, her perception that Ms Tamhne lied resulted in her threatening to record her.  She denied outright that she had brought a dictaphone to the contact that followed that threat, only for it to be found in her bag and produced triumphantly by A.  That was simply a lie on her part, which she sought to excuse by saying it had no batteries.  Just why she would be carrying a dictaphone to a supervised contact was not explained by her.  Mr Wood said it was not a comfortable occurrence and it raised a concern as to her impetuosity which was a feature of her life and it worried him how she would manage attending on a range of professionals, take a broad view and act on what could be difficult advice, if she did not agree with it.  

132.	So reverting to the specific risk findings that I am asked to make, first of all there is a unanimity of professional view about F, even Mr Wood identified him as a risk due to his difficult and conflictual relationships and identified going forwards the clear potential for dispute and disruption.  I agree.  It seems that to an extent F has backed off because of his antipathy to the social workers, but, absent them, the landscape could change dramatically.  I remind myself that PGM was ambivalent about the risk that he posed to the point that she did not seem to recognise it and lacked insight into its reality and in ruling out physical harm, had no concept of the emotional harm.  Thus I have no confidence in her assertion that, were he to come looking, she would send him packing off to court.  Despite his non-engagement now, I think generally she holds a positive view of what he could offer the children and would be slow to deny him the opportunity of contact with the risk to the children that was identified by Ms Gilley in her risk assessment, as well as others.  

133.	There is, of course, a natural and understandable sympathy towards her son, but there is a naivety as well that either denies or minimises the risk and with it a failure of insight as to the real harm that he is capable of causing.  If push came to shove, then provided F was behaving himself when he made the approach, she would allow contact, in my judgment.

134.	Second, M, notwithstanding Mr Stonor’s criticism of Ms Mitcheson and what I accept is no other evidence of collusion that would point to a secret agenda, I have no good reason not to accept Ms Mitcheson’s evidence as to the gist of what was said in the taxi last year.  The detail about PGM’s concern regarding her work position is something that Ms Mitcheson could not possibly have made up and indeed it has echoes in other things that she has said at different times to different people about work, whether she would not would not and her attitude to it.  Whether it is evidence of a plan is another matter altogether.  I do not think, on all of the evidence, that there is any such plan because there is no evidence that would directly support it.  So I do not think that there is any current agenda for the care to be moved from PGM and PGF to the children’s mother.  

135.	I think that, however much the mother would like it to happen, neither is presently planning for it, but that is not to say that it is a risk to be ignored.   Plans can and do change and it is not difficult to see circumstances in which they could.  So far as M is concerned, as the Guardian said, she is presently in a good place and has been for some time.  But, as the Guardian warned, she has been before, such that the supervision order was made regarding support in 2011, following which things spiralled out of control.  M’s past issues remain unaddressed, yet PGM is unstinting in her praise for M.  That praise is not misplaced but the circumstances that give rise to it have not been consistently present.  It is therefore not difficult to identify risk looking to the medium to longer term, which cannot be dismissed as fanciful, that circumstances will arise in which the mother’s understandable wish to care for the children may be fulfilled.  

136.	Third, the plan: as I have said, the fact that it has changed from time to time is not a matter of criticism.  The issue is the clarity around the present one.  At the end of the evidence, I am afraid I have no clear picture of what it was and I suspect that Mrs Morgan came closest to identifying the true approach when she told me that PGM had told her that the local authority had said that she would have to give up work to which she, Mrs Morgan, responded well that was not for the local authority to say, but for her to decide.  Her response to that was well in that case she would go back to work.  The impression was that she would give up work if she was told to, but not otherwise and was keen to go back.  That was not inconsistent with the picture that Mr Wood formed of a relatively short pause of a year or two to settle the children, but perhaps the most remarkable evidence was that of PGF who, on the plan outlined by Mrs Morgan, of Sure Start, nursery, D and E, said that was still the plan as far as he understood it.  He expressed his willingness to fulfil the teatime/bedtime slot when she was at work.

137.	That evidence, clearly contradicting his wife’s evidence, was striking because it demonstrated to the court that first, insofar as there was any clarity around the plan, it was that sooner rather than later she intended to go back to work.  Second, the enormity of the task caring, particularly, for A had not been considered in this context, it really ignored the extent of the help and the consistency of care that A needed at home and the commitment to multiple appointments that would be necessary to meet his needs.  Both PGF and PA work normal hours.  Such appointments are unlikely to happen on evenings and weekends.  PGF confirmed that he could not get time off to do this from work, so it would all fall to his wife.  This lack of planning and clarity is, I find, another significant risk arising from her optimism and A has particularly to benefit from consistency of identified primary carers.  That would have predominantly to be PGM and, quite apart from looking at the capacity to meet those needs, to be proactive there needs to be the insight to see that and plan accordingly.  As the evidence stands, I really do not know what PGM intends other than a willingness, which I am sure is genuine, to do what is expected.  She does not seem to have worked out that for the foreseeable future A needs a full time, consistent carer and is unlikely to thrive in an environment where he has multiple carers and she should have made plans accordingly.  Even if she has, it does not appear to be a plan which she has shared with her husband who had a quite different understanding.

138.	As for PGF I have indicated that I am as sure that he is as decent, loving and caring as PGM and PA describe, as I am that, despite Mr Wood’s initial view of him in his first report, he is a reluctant participant in this plan.  I accept that character wise he is the polar opposite of his wife, that is to a significant extent he will follow her: it is not a criticism.  Many relationships work thus and do so successfully and it has worked to PA’s advantage, as I have accepted.  Were this case simply about B, I doubt if it would be a significant impediment or pose worrying risk, but the case is not and the responses of PGF were, in my judgment, revelatory so far as A is concerned.  He simply does not understand his specific and potentially challenging needs.  Rewarding at present, he may not always be, particularly as B overtakes him, which is likely to happen quite soon. 

139.	A’s future progression is unknown but may or may not be linear.  A’s level of insight as to the extent to which he may be different to other children of his own age is also unknown.  But the risk that he will develop frustration in due course is self-evident and there can be no guarantee that he will remain the relatively easy going and appealing child he is at present.  Whilst PGM’s approach carries risk, in her husband’s case there was first complete failure to learn what the could have done from the papers about A and his needs.  He is not even a child he has seen much of in contact.  I regard this as nothing short of incomprehensible in a committed, proposed Special Guardian, regardless of what a professional might have expected.  Second, he has taken a naïve view of what little he does know about A’s needs, evidenced in the comment about different children developing at different times.  Third, the failure to pull out all the stops to get to the contact specially arranged for him to be seen, speaks for itself.  Having heard all of the evidence, I remain of the view that the car hire fiasco is one in which there is blame to be attached to both sides.  The local authority did arrange a car.  It was not its fault that there were difficulties over delivery, but when that plan did not come to fruition, PGM and PGF were left high and dry.  So to that extent there is fault.  But the fuss made over the car, the petulant refusal to hand over the phone number better to facilitate communication and then the complete failure to make alternative arrangements to travel, all point, in my judgment, to the correctness of Mr Spain’s assertion to him that he had no intention of travelling.  It was an instance of it not being alright on the day and the complete lack of flexibility in the most pressing of circumstances, that points to “stubborn and belligerence”, Mr Wood’s words, that plays not just into commitment, but to deal with challenging circumstances of which there will be many more, particularly with A in the future.  

140.	Whilst I think that PGF will go along with his wife’s plans, whatever they are for the children, there is a lack of any enquiry into what it will entail, which means that even at this stage he has a very limited and simplistic view.  He rather grudgingly, I felt, said he supposed it was important to know what he was taking on.  As at now, he still does not.  That is not the position of a committed carer and it is a significant risk for any child, but particularly one like A.

141.	In terms of understanding his expectations, I have made findings in relation to PGF.  His understanding is very limited indeed. PGM plainly has a better understanding but it is, in my judgment, a simplistic one.  In answer to the point that A was likely to be upset if he was moved from his present carers, to which she said:

“He is going to someone he knows he cares for, who every time I see him he runs into my arms and tells me how much he has missed me, he feels safe with me.”

142.	It is quite a revelatory statement, because the court has also received evidence of A’s complete lack of discrimination in approaching adults who are strangers, rushing up to them and showing them affection in response to friendliness being shown towards him.  In saying what she did, and there is no doubt there is a bond and a relationship between her and A, it ignores why A might behave like that.  That said, like Mr Wood I am sure that PGM has the capacity to learn and understand A’s needs.  She has the intelligence.  She has the more recent experience of successful child care with PA.  The question is whether she would apply herself, as required, to this particular child.  She means well, but that she has failed to encourage her husband to find out what there is to know about A is, in my judgment, a worrying sign that she does not appreciate the scale of the problem.  I appreciate that she has not had the advantage of legal advice, but even absent that, one would have anticipated the insight to appreciate that the pair of them needed to be as clued up as possible and to show that they were, and that they understood and could do what was required.  That she failed to do this, has managed to alienate herself from the foster carers who could have helped and not taken steps to access training despite the advice from Mrs Morgan in 2013 and Mr Wood this year, is another concern.  As Mr Wood put it, “it didn’t stack up.”

143.	It is, I fear, a combination of the excessive optimism and her antagonistic relationship with professionals that has prevented this.  These are, I find, risks of significance going forwards.  Excessive optimism about A’s progress, “a couple of years behind” was one comment, is a real risk.  If he does not progress in a linear way, which is what I think PGM thinks is going to happen, there is no knowing if that will occur and if frustrations start occurring as B overtakes him, I do not think that she anticipates that or has the patience or pro-activity or ability to work with professionals who may give her advice that does not coincide with her general optimism.  

144.	The last matter was what I call “practical problems” and I deal with this briefly.  It seems to the court that the law is clear and that the responsibility rests on the present local authority to ensure the provision of suitable services.  It will be inconvenient; it is to an extent difficult because of the distances and it will undoubtedly come at a significant financial cost to the local authority, at least for the three years dictated by the regulations.  But the throwing up of hands, effectively the local authority’s response, is a defeatist response which could not and would not stand in the way of placement if in all other respects it is the best place for the children to be.  

145.	I prefer the evidence of Mr Wood that where there is a will there is way and that the commissioning of services, while time consuming, would ensure an orderly transfer of responsibility to professionals more locally based.  Delay is inevitable because the statement of special educational needs is incomplete and it needs to be finished and, in any event, the transfer would have to be preceded by a good deal of preparation in the form of increased understanding, increased contact and so on.  In my judgment, the delay would not just be purposeful, manageable but necessary and the risk associated with the transfer, whilst, like any change is not non-existence, is an acceptable one which, with imagination, can be used to ensure as seamless a transfer as possible.  Therefore whilst there is some risk it is in my judgment very far from being an overwhelming risk.  

146.	The final evidence to which I shall refer is the Guardian’s.  She comes to the case not only with immense experience but with the background knowledge of the previous proceedings.  She sat through the hearing in June and seven of the eight days of this hearing, having been provided with a transcript of the evidence she missed on the sixth day.  Her judgment in June was that A’s progress was secondary to the stability, security and high levels of stimulation he has been receiving, focusing on PGM who was troubled by her inconsistent and limited support when the family had moved, quite apart from her relationship with the parents and she could not recommend placement, despite identifying many positives.  

147.	She felt sufficiently strongly to want to support the local authority appeal and, by November, her attitude had hardened.  The focus by now solely on PGM.  She was troubled by Mr Wood’s report, particularly the emphasis on self-report and she quoted a number of his comments about her attitude to professionals and intolerance of the foster carers, whom she felt were sabotaging her case.  Paying tribute to her commendable commitment, she commented on several risks identified by the local authority; PGM’s plan generally; the meeting of A’s needs; her general state of denial; and PGF’s doubtful commitment.  

148.	Her balancing exercise is clearly described in her report and coincides with the local authority’s conclusions.  The evidence she heard, she told me, reinforced her opinion, there were no gaps and she commented on the extent to which the issues had been explored, exhaustively I would say.  

149.	So I need to put this evidence into the context of the legal framework within which this decision falls to be considered.  I was indebted to Mr Spain for spelling out very clearly, not just to the court but to PGM in advance of the hearing, what the law is and I will summarise it, albeit in my own words, but I hope to the same effect.  In considering the options, I have regard to the considerable jurisprudence beginning with the judgment of the Supreme Court in Re B (A Child)[2013] UKSC33 followed by the more recent decisions of the Court of Appeal in Re B-S (Children)[2013] EWCA Civ 1146 and then Re W [2013] EWCA Civ 1227, in which the President said that the principles from those two cases must now inform practice in all care cases.  

150.	Lord Neuberger in Re B dealing with a case where the local authority was seeking authority to place a child for adoption, noted that the threshold, although satisfied on a relatively modest basis, was being used to support final orders at the highest level of interference with Article 8 rights to life, permanent removal of a child and placement for adoption against the will of, for these purposes, the family.  

151.	It is that context that has to be considered, the court has to treat the welfare of the children as its paramount concern, which involves taking into account the factors set out in what is called for shorthand “the welfare checklist”, as well as the range of powers available.  It also has to be construed in accordance with the provisions of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child.  Lord Neuberger said this:

“A care order in a case such as this is a very extreme thing, a last resort, as would be very likely to result in a child being adopted against the wishes of both parents.  As already mentioned, it is clear that a judge cannot properly decide that a care order should be made in such circumstances, unless the order is proportionate, bearing in mind the requirements of Article 8.  It appears to me, given that the judge concluded that the Threshold was crossed, he should only have made a care order if he had been satisfied that this was necessary to do so in order to protect the interests of the child.  By necessary, I mean to use Lady Hale’s phrase ‘where nothing else will do’.  And I consider this conclusion is clear under the 1989 Act, interpreted absent of the Convention, but it is put beyond doubt by Article 8.”

152.	And he went on to say:

“It seems to me to be inherent in section 1, sub-section 1 that a care order should be a last resort, because the interests of the child would self-evidently require her relationship with her natural parents, (here I substitute a word ‘natural family’), to be maintained unless no other course was possible in her interests.”

153.	The Court of Appeal has recently emphasised that this did not promulgate any new legal test, as was explained in CM v Blackburn with Darwen Borough Council [2014] EWCA Civ 1479 it is simply directed at the court’s approach to the evidence needed to satisfy the statutory test, which involves the various elements to which I will refer.  

154.	I should also mention what the President said in Re B-S, reminding courts faced with making such far-reaching decisions, that amongst other things it is not enough to show that a child could be placed in a more beneficial environment for its upbringing.  The striking language used in B-S as to the degree of necessity required; the need to explore and attempt alternative solutions and the reminder that the court’s assessment of the family’s ability to discharge the responsibilities towards the child must take into account the assistance and support which the authorities would offer.  

155.	There is also, finally, the need for proper evidence from the local authority and the Guardian, addressing all the options realistically possible, containing an analysis of the arguments for and against each.  

156.	That in turn leads into the decision of McFarlane LJ in Re G [2013] EWCA Civ 965, where he described that the task facing the court as a “welfare evaluation in which the paramount concern is the interests of the child.”  This is a case where the court has before it the option of adoption and so the evaluation has to take place in the context of the welfare provisions of the 2002 Adoption & Children Act.  McFarlane LJ was critical of a linear approach and said that the judicial task is to undertake:

“A global, holistic evaluation of each of the options available for the child’s future upbringing before deciding which of those options best meets the duty to afford paramount consideration to the child’s welfare.”

157.	He went on to say:

“What is required is a balancing exercise in which each option is evaluated to the degree of detail necessary to analyse away its own internal positives and negatives and each option is then compared side by side against the competing option or options.”

158.	Ryder LJ in the case of CM reminding himself of the passage I have cited from Lord Neuberger’s judgment in Re B, went on to note that:

“What is in a child’s interest is not simply whether any other course is possible, but whether there is another course which is possible ‘in the child’s interests’.”

159.	He continued at paragraph 36 to say this:

“It is in the very nature of placement proceedings that in many of them there will be alternative options that are at least hypothetically feasible and which may have some merit.  The fact that, after consideration of the evidence, the court, on an analysis of the options chooses adoption over another option, does not mean that such a choice is tainted because something else may have been reasonable and available.  The whole purpose of the proportionality evaluation is to respect the rights that are engaged and cross check the welfare evaluation.”

160.	In this case, the issue of the threshold has not been contested.  It is satisfied by the findings made in June.  The court is obliged to make an order, because A and B’s interests are such that they cannot be brought up by their parents, by the concession of the mother and the disengagement of the father.  The mother, of course, receives enormous credit for taking that extraordinarily difficult and selfless decision.  She is a person with genuine merit, despite her difficulties and her importance to her children is a very important factor in the decision.  The court therefore needs to find alternative homes for these very young children and, in doing so, is obliged to consider the realistic options of which it is agreed there are but two.

161.	Since one involves the placement for adoption, the 2002 welfare checklist is engaged.  The court has received an evaluation from the social worker and the Guardian and it has been robustly argued.  It is ultimately though for the court to perform this evaluation and, based on the findings, looking at PGM, there are a number of factors, which I suggest can be set out in bullet points, in her favour.

•	She can provide a home within the birth family.
•	The children’s identity will be maintained.
•	The children’s contact with their mother can at least be guaranteed.
•	The grandmother has the very many positive qualities that shine out in her success with PA, which I set out earlier in this judgment and do not repeat here, but take fully into account.

162.	Set against that, however, there are risks.  Again, in bullet points:

•	The unresolved and unexplained history regarding F and PGM’s response to it
•	The over-enthusiasm or impetuosity with which she gets carried away, such that it Her failure properly to identify the real risk that F poses.
•	The danger that the compliance and positive cooperation of M will not be maintained.
•	The lack of clarity around the plan, which is directly relevant to the issue of insight.
•	The lack of PGF’s commitment.
•	The understanding, or lack of it, and unrealistic expectations of A.
•	Her ability to work with professionals where they disagree.

163.	Turning to the other option in favour of adoption, there are these core points, it seems to me.

•	The children will enjoy the continuity of what is described as very high quality care where they thrive and where A has made huge strides.  “Very insightful” was the Guardian’s description.
•	The carers are totally committed and have worked tirelessly with professionals to understand and meet those needs.
•	They understand those needs exceedingly well and have proved that they can meet them.
•	They have already strong attachments; in B’s case, they are the only primary carers that she has known and they have been A’s carers now for 21 months.

164.	Set against that, there are these three points:

•	The children will undoubtedly lose their identity which will change.
•	They will cease to be lifelong members of their birth family.
•	They will lose contact with members of their birth family, certainly in their minority, with their extended birth family and it is not clear whether their relationship with M can be maintained.

165.	I have considered these very carefully and in the context of closing submissions where Mr Stonor, in particular, emphasised the positives in favour of M and asked if the negatives could surely not be addressed by PGM having focused professional help over the history regarding F, by direct involvement with professionals regarding the children to improve insight and understanding.  As was said recently in describing the exercise as “a balancing exercise”, it can be misleading, because the factors going into each side of the scales do not necessarily have equal weight and it is not simply a case of counting the number of items on each side, but considering their respective importance.  

166.	So I come to the checklist, to which the court must have regard.  First of all, these children are very young, both chronologically and, in A’s case, developmentally.  Hurtful though it may be to hear, I suspect that if asked for their wishes and feelings it would be to remain in the only home B has known and the longest consistent home that A has had.  But I accept it is not a matter of great weight in this case, given their ages. 

167.	Under sub-paragraph (b), each child has a need for love, security, a good quality care with the carer or carers to whom they are well attached; that applies to both children.  Whilst B is a normal, healthy child with age appropriate physical, mental and psychological development, the same cannot be said of A.  In a very serious way he is delayed cognitively, speech, mobility, educational.  All of the professionals have commented on the fact that he needs special parenting skills and these form part of his characteristics which also the court has to have regard to under sub-paragraph (d).

168.	Under sub-paragraph (e), B has largely been spared any harm; A has not, by reason of the findings made in June and, in saying that B has largely been spared harm, she was potentially exposed to significant harm pre-birth.  The risk of future harm arises, in the first instance, from those risks that the court has found, regarding PGM and secondly from those risks materialising in a way that reintroduces F, or even M, should she have the misfortune to lapse in the future as she has done in the past.

169.	Sub-paragraph (c) ties in with considerations of the likely effect on the children of ceasing to be members of their birth family and becoming adopted persons.  It is not the case that it is anticipated that they will return to either of their parents, albeit the risks associated with that are identified, but they would also be denied being brought up by their extended family.  That then ties in, in sub-paragraph (f), with the relationship that the children have, not just with their grandmother and her family, but M.  If PGM could consistently meet their needs that would be of undoubted value, but the reverse would be so, if one of a number of the risks identified materialised.

170.	Whilst the value of the family relationship is rightly stressed in Re B and the cases following it, it is not, as the local authority put it, “the trump card”.  It is plain from Ryder LJ’s recent remarks, as well as Macur LJ in Re W [2014] EWCA Civ 405, it is but one aspect of the holistic evaluation, the relative weights of each in the scales are here relevant and so when Mr Stonor, quoting PA, says the foster carers have done a good job, “but there is family here”, it is obviously an attractive approach, but it assumes that this is in some way determinative.  It is not, because the court has to decide what is best for the children, life long.  

171.	Loss of birth family is a significant thing to be brought up with and it is hard, as the Guardian says, to anticipate its long term effect.  But secure, consistent, alternative attachment, which in B’s case would be from birth, are likely to be very strong, protective factors.  

172.	So, in those circumstances, I have to make a decision, not just for the short term, but the long term, against this background.  It seems to the court that if any single factor stands out, it has to be the very special needs of A.  The conclusion that I have come to is that these are such that the risks of placement with the PGM/PGF family are such that the balance does decisively come down in favour of the local authority plan of adoption.  

173.	The long term benefits of remaining in the care of carers who have demonstrably shown that they are fully attuned to his needs and can meet them, with insight, that has already produced dividends, are clear.  I acknowledge, of course, that the authorities could and should provide help to assist the family which would benefit A to maintain a placement there.  But that is dependent upon the ability and willingness, through thick and thin, of the carers and, here, PGM, to cooperate with it and to work openly and honestly in respect of it.  It seems to the court that the findings that have been made militate against that. 

174.	I do not doubt, as PGM said to me in closing that she wishes to love, to care for and to protect these children within the family and, furthermore, that she would not intentionally harm them.  But the risk of that happening, particularly to A, is not one that the court can take, having regard to his particular needs.  It follows that I am satisfied that the holistic balancing exercise, as well as consideration of Article 8 proportionality, dictates that what is best for these children, who all agree must stay together, and therefore retain to that extent a family tie life long, is for them to be made the subject of a care order and placement order each.

175.	I cannot make a placement order without the consent of the parents.  They do not consent.  For the reasons I have given, I am satisfied, on consideration of their welfare life long, that it is necessary that I dispense with their consent and I do so, using the power under section 52 of the Adoption & Children Act.

176.	That leaves outstanding the issue of contact.  So far as PGM is concerned, sadly, it will come to an end and I approve a plan leading to an early final contact.  So far as F is concerned, the risk assessment I have referred to dictates that he should not be offered a final contact; a conclusion endorsed by the Guardian.  As the social worker said, he could nevertheless still provide valuable help with life story work and it is to be hoped that a means can be found to facilitate this.

177.	So far as M is concerned, the value of her contact, her commitment to it and her flexible willingness, endorsed by all, has led the local authority to agree that her contact should reduce in steps, but thereafter be maintained up to the time that any adoption order is made.  She asks me, in the circumstances that have now arisen, to consider the making of an open adoption.  Mr Stonor does not seek an order under section 26 of the 2002 Act that gives the court the power to control post-adoption contact but, nevertheless, invites the prospective adopters to consider this, after the dust has settled from this litigation.  

178.	Julie Clark was unqualified in her acceptance of the value of this contact.  She described the foster carers as wanting a plan to be made in the best interests of the children.  I interpreted that, and Ms Clark did not demur, as being at least open to the idea of some post-adoption contact.  It has to be said that Ms Aitcheson was more guarded, particularly because of the youth of the children and because of the potentially difficult dynamics that may arise as B overtakes A.  I think she also carries with her some reservation about M, because of what she saw as the failure of the supervision order that she had supported previously.  My view is that this is neither the time nor the place to make such a decision, which ultimately I consider is one to be made by the adopters, fully informed, once this litigation is over.  There are no doubt good competing arguments on each side; the mother on the one hand pointing to the value of the relationship and what she can bring; and the Guardian on the other who has her concerns as to the durability of the mother’s presentation.  In short, I consider that the door must not be closed to the mother at this stage; I welcome the local authority decision to keep it open by continued contact, following this order and placement, but it needs to be considered calmly and objectively, in the context of the adoption application.  

179.	The outcome for the family, I know, is desperately sad and that PGM will be particularly upset and will feel that she has had success snatched away from her.  There is little that I can say to assuage her understandable upset.  Nor will she agree, I fear, with a number of my findings.  What I hope, however, is that she can accept that the evidence and that the issues have had the fullest possible ventilation and been subject to proper scrutiny and argument, in a process that has been transparent.  In the final analysis, there was no professional support for her position and the findings I have made really explain the reason why.

180.	It is, of course, heartbreaking and I can only offer the consolation that the order I make offers, in the court’s judgment, on all of the evidence, the best opportunity for A and B to develop their full potential, whatever that may be, with the least possible disruption, in a setting where they have already been unequivocally claimed.  That may be some comfort in the long term.

181.	I thank everybody for their assistance in what has been a difficult case.  Not just the advocates who I have mentioned, but also PGM and those who have helped her along the way.  As I have indicated, I will direct a transcript of this judgment should be prepared, the cost of which can be discussed but I anticipate will be shared between the public funding certificates of the local authority, the parents and the children.  That can be made available to not just family members in due course, but to the adopters.  I am going to invite Mr Spain in due course to draft an order.  

182.	The final matter I just want to mention is this, that there is of course a right of appeal against this decision.  The circumstances in which an appeal can be made are limited and this is not the place to explain them here and now, but what is important for PGM and the family to appreciate is that any application for permission to appeal needs to be made within 21 days of today’s date.  

183.	That concludes the judgment.

End of judgment 

We hereby certify that this judgment has been approved by His Honour Judge Simon Wood.
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